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ABSTRACT 
Critical infrastructure (such as water and wastewater, electric power, transportation, and 
telecommunication systems) constitute the backbone of modern society.  They provide essential 
goods and services to communities, supporting the population’s well-being.  Hazard events of past 
years revealed that the vulnerability of communities is related to the vulnerability of their critical 
infrastructure.  Critical infrastructure are exposed to low-probability high-consequence hazard 
events.  Reductions and interruptions in their functionality may result in considerable impacts on 
society.  A prompt recovery of the critical infrastructure leads to a prompt recovery of the economic 
vitality and the general well-being of the impacted communities.  Interdependencies among 
infrastructure and between infrastructure and social systems may increase the vulnerability of 
communities and exacerbate the impact of hazard events, often resulting in widespread disruption 
and slower recovery.   
 
This dissertation proposes a novel probabilistic methodology to quantify the reliability and resilience 
of interdependent critical infrastructure.  Infrastructure are modeled mathematically as networks, 
extending to civil engineering applications well-established tools of graph theory.  Topology and 
flow-based approaches are used to translate the physical damage of the single components into loss 
or reduction of network functionality and to develop network capacity and demand models.  Network 
capacity and demand models are integrated in a time-varying network reliability and resilience 
analysis to assess the network response in the immediate aftermath of a hazard event and at different 
times during recovery process, as the network components are repaired.  To capture the role of 
interdependencies and propagate the loss or reduction of functionality across all dependent networks, 
this dissertation presents a novel multi-layer heterogeneous network model.  In the proposed model, 
the heterogeneity comes from having different components in each infrastructure (i.e., generation, 
storage, transmission and distribution components).  The different classes of interdependency (e.g., 
physical, geographical, social, etc.) are modeled as different layers. 
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This dissertation applies the proposed methodology to a series of example testbeds, including 
isolated and interdependent, virtual and real critical infrastructure.  Results shed light into the role of 
interdependencies among infrastructure and between infrastructure and social systems in the 
recovery of communities.  Results of this dissertation aim to benefit civil engineers to develop cost-
effective mitigations measures and practices in infrastructure design, construction and planning, as 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Critical infrastructure (such as water and wastewater, electric power, transportation, and 
telecommunication systems) constitute the backbone of modern society.  They provide essential 
goods and services to communities, supporting the population’s well-being, safety and economic 
vitality.  They are interconnected systems of distinct and interdependent networks, or systems, 
(systems of systems) that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a 
continuous flow of essential goods and services (PCCIP, 1997).  Critical infrastructure are exposed 
to low-probability high-consequence hazard events.  When hazard events threaten the functionality 
of one or more infrastructure, the resilience of a community is called into play, which has been 
defined as the “ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover 
rapidly from disruptions” (PPD-21, 2013).  Hazard events of past years, such as the blackout in 
Northeast America (2003), Hurricanes Katrina (2005) Harvey, Irma and Maria (2017), Superstorm 
Sandy (2012), the floods in South Carolina (2015) and North Carolina (2016), the earthquakes in 
Chile (2010), New Zealand (2010-2011) and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan (2011), underscore 
the continued vulnerability of society to multiple hazards, and the pressing need to promote resilient 
infrastructure (Gardoni and LaFave, 2016; Gardoni et al., 2016; Gardoni, 2017; Gardoni, 2018; 
Gardoni and Murphy, 2018).  Several reports and presidential policy directives (e.g., PCCIP, 1997; 
PPD-21, 2013; ATC, 2016) underscored the strategic importance of critical infrastructure and the 
importance of understanding the societal needs in disaster recovery.  Connecting communities and 
critical facilities (e.g., hospital, assembly points, and schools), infrastructure play a strategic rule 
in the aftermath of hazard events, allowing for rescue and recovery efforts.  A prompt recovery of 
the critical infrastructure leads to a prompt recovery of the economic vitality and the general well-
being of the impacted communities.  Critical infrastructure consist of multiple interacting systems.  
Components of these systems are typically spatially distributed over large geographic areas and 
heterogeneous, i.e. composed by different types of components, such as generation, storage, 
transmission and distribution components.  In addition, individual infrastructure systems are 
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typically significantly interconnected with each other.  Several classifications of the classes of the 
dependency/interdependency can be considered, for example, physical, cyber, geographical and 
logical dependency/interdependency (Rinaldi et al., 2001).  The aforementioned past events have not 
only revealed the vulnerabilities of individual critical infrastructure, but also showed the importance 
of dependencies and interdependencies among them (Vespignani, 2010; Chang, 2014).  The 
occurrence of hazard events may cause direct physical damage to several vulnerable components in 
a given network.  In addition, a disruption in one network may cause cascading effects, resulting in 
disruptions of dependent systems and, more generally, degrading the functionality of affected 
interconnected systems (Buldyrev et al., 2010, Franchin and Cavalieri, 2015; Guidotti et al., 
2016a).  As a result, interdependencies among infrastructure and between infrastructure and social 
systems may increase the vulnerability of communities and exacerbate the impact of hazard events, 
often resulting in widespread disruption and slower recovery.   
 
1.2 Current studies and researches 
 
The scientific community is actively working on the developments of models for regional risk and 
resilience analysis with the overarching goal of promoting and achieving resilient communities.  
Following the presidential policy directives, resilience is herein defined as the ability of the 
community to prepare for and to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly 
from disruptions.  The concept of resilience is often measured using dimensions of vulnerability, 
severity of consequences, and time to recover from failures (e.g., Bruneau et al., 2003; Chang and 
Shinozuka, 2004; Gardoni et al., 2007; Bocchini et al., 2012; González et al., 2016; Guidotti et al., 
2016a, 2016b; Sharma et al., 2017).  Assessing the ability to provide essential goods requires, in 
general, both a quantification of the capacity of the network and of the demand on the network.  
Specifically, one of the most challenging modeling aspects is the prediction of the post-event demand 
because of the uncertainty in the human behaviors, such as evacuation or the decision to relocate.  A 
promising approach to track the post-event evolution of electric power system demand has been 
proposed by Didier et al. (2015, 2017) and Sun et al. (2015).  Among the initiatives of the scientific 
community to promote resilient infrastructure, the European project SYNER-G provides a 
computational framework for risk and reliability analysis of civil infrastructure systems, including 
social losses as a result of physical direct damage to facilities and their lack of functionality (e.g., 
Franchin, 2014, Franchin and Cavalieri, 2015).  The Argonne’s Resilient Infrastructure Initiative 
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focuses on enabling the design of resilient infrastructure, able to reduce both human and economic 
losses (e.g., Petit et al., 2015; Clifford et al., 2016).  The NIST-funded Center focuses on the nexus 
between social, economic and technological systems and develops models to narrow the gap 
between engineering and social science aspects of resilience planning (e.g., Ellingwood et al., 
2016a, 2016b, 2017; Guidotti et al., 2016a).  Following the review on modeling and simulation of 
interdependent critical infrastructure proposed by Ouyang (2014), current approaches can be 
categorized in the following broad areas: empirical, agent-based, system dynamics based, 
economic-theory based, and network-based.  Empirical approaches are based on historical disaster 
data and expert experience (e.g., Nojima and Kameda, 1996; Krimgold et al., 2006; Laefer et al., 
2006).  Agent-based approaches describe the complex interdependent nature of the problem 
capturing the interactions of autonomous agents (e.g., Kaegi, 2009).  System dynamics-based 
approaches model the dynamic behavior of interdependent infrastructure by capturing causes and 
effects in the damaged scenario (e.g., Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000; Kollikkathara et al., 2010).  
Economic theory-based approaches are based on economic models such as input-output (I-O) 
models (e.g., Leontief, 1951) and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (e.g., Rose, 2004; 
Cutler et al., 2016).  Network-based approaches model the infrastructure by networks, with 
description of their topologies (topology-based approaches, e.g. Patterson and Apostolakis, 2007; 
Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007a; Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008; Guikema and Gardoni, 2009; Guidotti 
et al., 2017a, 2017b) and flow (flow-based approaches, e.g., Wallace et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2007; 
Guidotti et al., 2016a, 2016b; Chmielewski et al., 2016).  Among other possible approaches, in the 
literature we can find the hierarchical holographic modeling approaches (e.g., Haimes, 1981, 
2008), the high-level architecture approaches (e.g., Eusgeld and Nan, 2009; Eusgeld et al., 2011), 
the Petri-net based approaches (e.g., Petri, 1962; Luna et al., 2011), the dynamic control system 
theory based approaches (e.g., Fioriti et al., 2010), and the Bayesian network approaches (e.g., 
Hadjsaid et al., 2009; Tabandeh and Gardoni, 2015; Johansen and Tien, 2017). 
 
In this dissertation, the focus will be on network-based approaches, namely topology and flow-
based.  Topology-based approaches capture the connectivity of the considered infrastructure to other 
supporting infrastructure, which is generally a necessary condition for a fully operational/recovered 
infrastructure.  The concept of network failure in topology-based models is typically defined as the 
loss of connection after a disturbance between some nodes and the rest of the network.  Flow-based 
approaches capture the ability of the critical infrastructure to provide essential goods and services to 
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the community they serve.  The concept of network failure in flow-based approaches is typically 
defined in terms of loss or reduction of functionality, which is the impossibility of the network to 
provide the required amount of goods and services.  From a modeling point of view, network-
based approaches offer the significant advantage of modeling infrastructure as mathematical 
entities, i.e. networks, applying well-established tools of graph theory to civil engineering.  A 
network is generally defined as a system of interconnected elements or nodes.  Networks can be 
found in many different fields.  For example, in the human body, we find networks in the nervous 
system, with neural networks connecting neurons with synapses, and the cardiovascular system, 
with a complex net of blood vessels connecting other systems, such as the respiratory, digestive or 
muscular system.  Examples of physical networks are those that allow the transportation of people 
or resources, such as roadways or railways, electrical power and water supply systems.  Other 
examples are technological networks, such as the World Wide Web, and social networks, such as 
those among people or animals.  While in different fields, networks can often be modeled using a 
common formulation.  In recent years, many studies in statistics dealt with technological networks 
and social networks.  They focused mainly on the state of the network, evaluating the impact of a 
random or targeted attack (e.g., Albert et al., 1999, 2000; Crucitti et al., 2003; Lusseau et al., 2003; 
Arianos et al., 2009; Schneider et al., 2011; Zhang and Chen, 2013, 2015).  
 
Focusing on network-based approaches in civil engineering, extensive work has been conducted on 
the assessment of reliability and resilience of individual systems, like transportation systems, 
pipelines and other lifelines, vulnerable to hazard events (e.g., Pitilakis et al., 2006; Kang et al., 
2008; Guikema and Gardoni, 2009; Lee et al., 2011; Cubrinovski et al., 2011; Orense et al., 2011; 
Wotherspoon et al., 2011; Kurtz et al., 2015; Chmielewski et al., 2016; Guidotti et al., 2016b, 2017a).  
As pointed out by a review paper from Frangopol and Bocchini (2012), researches in this field 
have followed different aspects, including: i) the interaction of components in a spatially 
distributed system, (e.g., Lleras-Echeverri and Sanchez-Silva, 2001; Kang et al., 2008; Guikema 
and Gardoni, 2009; Kang et al., 2008; Song and Kang, 2009); ii) the variability in time of the 
characteristics of infrastructure’s components, (e.g., Akgül and Frangopol, 2003; Bastidas-Arteaga 
et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2009;Lee et al., 2011); iii) the interdependency among different 
infrastructure and the cascading failures (e.g., Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007a, 2007b; Dueñas-Osorio 
and Vemuru, 2009; Hernández-Fajardo and Dueñas-Osorio, 2009; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Guidotti 
et al., 2016a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b); iv) the economic constraints in the life-cycle analysis of the 
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infrastructure (e.g.,Frangopol and Bocchini, 2011; Jane, 2011).  From a computational point of 
view, Monte Carlo simulation methods have been widely used for the study of system reliability 
(e.g., Zio, 2005; Zio et al., 2006; Naess et al., 2009; Yeh et al., 2010).  These methods have been 
applied to transportation network reliability (e.g., Guikema and Gardoni, 2009; Günneç and 
Salman, 2011; Decò and Frangopol, 2013; Ghosh et al., 2014; Rokneddin et al., 2014).  Monte 
Carlo simulation results are often a benchmark in the development and application of non-
sampling methods, such as the matrix-based system reliability (MSR) method for transportation 
networks (e.g., Kang et al., 2008; Song and Kang, 2009; Lee et al., 2011).  
 
1.3 Research goals 
 
Much of the existing research focuses mainly on component performance, investigating the 
contribution of single components to the functionality of the corresponding single network.  As 
discussed in the previous section, a growing body of research in the last decade has begun to focus 
on the performance of critical systems under hazard events, using models to predict, simulate, 
measure or improve levels of damage and rates of recovery in those systems.  Available models, 
however, do not include typically probabilistic scenarios of the damage state of the single 
components and of the entire system, assessing the network reliability and resilience based on 
deterministic values of the measures of connectivity or functionality.  Measures of network 
connectivity and functionality have a variability that needs to be considered for a better estimate 
of the reliability and service reliability of networks.  To develop a probabilistic methodology to 
take into account the uncertainties in topology and flow based approaches to the reliability and 
resilience analysis of critical infrastructure is the first goal of the dissertation. 
 
Moreover, to understand the overall functionality of a damaged system, one must consider the 
possibility of multiple component failures and its cascading effects due to the interdependencies 
among physical infrastructure and between physical infrastructure and social systems.  When 
infrastructure systems are damaged, they often propagate failures to other systems and result in 
widespread disruption.  For this reason, interdependent networks may experience system failure for 
a lower number of directly damaged components and more abruptly than isolated systems.  
Probabilistic models of the interdependencies between infrastructure is of utmost importance when 
identifying vulnerabilities of infrastructure’s components, informing investment prioritization and, 
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ultimately, improving the reliability and resilience of infrastructure.  In addition, population 
characteristics are not uniformly or evenly distributed within communities.  To locate spatially their 
significant variations is of great importance in modeling the human response and, in turn, the 
reliability and resilience of the considered community and the impact of a damaging event.  Models 
of the physical infrastructure should capture these variations with proper levels of resolution, or 
granularity.  To develop a probabilistic model to capture the multiple interdependencies among 
heterogeneous components of physical infrastructure and to capture probabilistically the 
interdependencies between physical infrastructure and social systems, considering the role of model 
granularity, is the second goal of the dissertation. 
 
This dissertation pursues the above goals by proposing a probabilistic methodology to model the 
network dependencies and interdependencies, and to assess the reliability and resilience of critical 
infrastructure.  To estimate the system recovery as a function of time at a community system scale, 
the proposed probabilistic procedure captures the direct physical damage, cascading effects due to 
interdependencies among physical infrastructure and between physical infrastructure and social 
systems.  Topology and flow-based approaches are used to translate the physical damage of the 
single components into loss or reduction of network functionality and to develop network capacity 
and demand models.  Network capacity and demand models are integrated in a time-varying network 
reliability and resilience analysis to assess the network response in the immediate aftermath of a 
hazard event and at different times during recovery process, as the network components are repaired.  
To capture the role of interdependencies and propagate the loss or reduction of functionality across 
all dependent networks, this dissertation presents a novel multi-layer heterogeneous network model.  
In the proposed model, the heterogeneity comes from having different components in each 
infrastructure (i.e., generation, storage, transmission and distribution components).  The different 
classes of interdependency (e.g., physical, geographical, social, etc.) are modeled as different layers.  
Models of infrastructure at different levels of granularity are proposed, pursuing an optimal tradeoff 
between granularity with its associated computational costs and accuracy in capturing the spatial 
variability in the reduction or loss of functionality, and in the social impact.  The developed 
methodology and procedure are general and applicable to any network and any natural or 
anthropogenic hazard.  
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1.4 Organization of the work 
 
This dissertation is organized in the following chapters.  Chapter 2 introduces probabilistic models 
of critical infrastructure, including a taxonomy of the infrastructure’s components, models of 
network topology for different granularities, models of capacity and demand at the component and 
network level and models of recovery.  Chapter 3 presents network-based approaches to the 
modeling of critical infrastructure, considering both topology and flow-based approaches.  Chapter 
4 introduces the multi-level heterogeneous network (MHN) model to assess probabilistically the 
cascading effects due to the multiple classes of (inter)dependency among critical infrastructure.  
Chapter 5 proposes a novel methodology to quantify the reliability and resilience of interdependent 
critical infrastructure, merging the probabilistic models presented in Chapter 2, the network-based 
approaches presented in Chapter 3 and the multi-level heterogeneous network model presented in 
Chapter 4 and taking into account the integration between physical infrastructure and social systems.  
In Chapter 6, this dissertation applies the proposed methodology to a series of example testbeds, 
including isolated and interdependent, virtual and real critical infrastructure.  Results collected in the 
concluding Chapter 7 shed light into the role of interdependencies among infrastructure and between 
infrastructure and social systems in the recovery of communities.  Results of this dissertation aim to 
benefit civil engineers to develop cost-effective mitigations measures and practices in infrastructure 
design, construction and planning, as well as emergency managers, planners and the community to 









CHAPTER 2: BASIC CONCEPTS FOR REGIONAL RISK AND RESILIENCE 
ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces a mathematical representation of critical infrastructure as networks, based on 
the concepts of graph theory.  Heterogeneous components characterize the functionality of critical 
infrastructure, which typically extends over large areas.  To capture the heterogeneity of the 
components of the infrastructure, the chapter proposes a taxonomy based on the components’ 
functionality.  To take into account the spatial dimension of the infrastructure, the chapter introduces 
the concepts of region of interest, network footprint, and tributary area.  The definition of tributary area 
affects the resolution, or granularity, of the network’s model.  For each considered model’s resolution, 
the proposed taxonomy leads to the definition of category-specific state variables models.  These 
models are used to define capacity and demand models for each component of the considered 
infrastructure.  This chapter introduces capacity and demand models that are used in a reliability and 
resilience analysis to derive component fragility and recovery functions.  These functions capture the 
loss or reduction and the recovery of functionality of the considered infrastructure component during 
its entire service life, including the impact of a damaging event and its repair.  The response of a critical 
infrastructure, however, is not only a function of the state of individual components in the network 
(determined by the component fragility and recovery functions) but also of the network connectivity 
state and flow.  For example, a specific component (e.g., a bridge in a transportation network) may be 
in a collapse damage state, but, because of the network redundancy, this may not compromise the 
overall functionality of the network.  The next chapter integrates the fragility and recovery functions 
of individual components into a network reliability and resilience analysis, presenting network capacity 
and demand models for topology-based and flow-based analyses.  In addition, the components in a 
network may lose their functionality due to the failure or functionality loss of supporting components 
that are part of either the same network or different networks.  Chapter 4 proposes a multi-layered 
heterogeneous network model to assess the cascading effects due to the multiple classes of 
(inter)dependency (i.e., physical, geographical, cyber, logical and social) among critical infrastructure.   
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2.2 Networks as mathematical representation of infrastructure 
 
Network-based approaches represent mathematically a generic infrastructure, or multiple systems 
of infrastructure, as networks.  Referring to the same object, in this dissertation, the term 
infrastructure will be used for the physical representation, the term network for the mathematical 
one.  Based on the concepts of graph theory (e.g., Ruohonen, 2013), a generic network ( , )G V E  
can be defined by the set V  of N  nodes or vertices, 1 2( , ,..., )NV v v v , and by the set E  of M  
links or edges that connect the nodes, 1 2( , ,..., )ME e e e .  A generic link ,  1me m M   connecting 
two nodes iv  and jv  (1 ,  1 ,  i N j N i j     ) can be also represented as ( , )ij i je v v .  
Generally, nodes iv  and jv  are connected if there exists a finite sequence of nodes and links from 
iv  to jv .  If all of the nodes of the network are connected to each other, we have a connected 
network.  Networks are typically represented in a matrix form through adjacency tables (Watts and 
Strogatz, Guidotti et al., 2016a, 2017a, 2017b).  The adjacency table of network G  is an N N  
matrix ( ) ( )[ ]G GijaA , (1 ,  1 )i N j N    , where 
( )G
ija  ( )i j  is either 1 if ( , )ij i je v v E  , or 
0 otherwise, and 
( ) 0Giia  , see Figure 2.1.  It is common, especially for physical networks, to 
weight the adjacency table with an N N  link weight table ,[ ]L L ijwW , where the weights ,L ijw  
( , 1, , )i j N  are used to capture a characteristic of interest of the link between nodes i  and j .  
For example, in the case of a transportation network, ,L ijw  could represent the distance or the travel 
time between the two end-nodes i  and j .  The adjacency table provides information on the 
connectivity of the network.  In civil engineering applications, physical infrastructure and systems 
of infrastructure under regular operational conditions can typically be modeled as connected 
networks. 
 
Figure 2.1.  Adjacency table for example networkG . 
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2.3 Taxonomy of infrastructure components 
 
The components of a civil infrastructure can be classified into the following categories, based on 
their function: generation, transportation and distribution components.  Generation (or source) 
components originate the essential goods and services.  Distribution (or sink) components use the 
goods and services.  Transmission component ensure the flow of goods and services from the 
generation components to the distribution components.  In addition to these categories, some 
infrastructure may have components that allow the storage of goods, as for example tanks in a 
water system.  Based on this taxonomy, I define, in the mathematical representation of 
infrastructure as network, the following sets: ,1 ,2 ,( , ,..., )GG G G G NV v v v , ,1 ,2 ,( , ,..., )TT T T T NV v v v , 
,1 ,2 ,( , ,..., )DD D D D NV v v v  and ,1 ,2 ,( , , , )SS S S S NV v v v  for the generation, transmission, distribution 
and storage nodes, respectively.  I then write the set V  of ( )G T D SN N N N N     heterogeneous 
nodes of network G  as the union of those sets 
 
 ,1 ,2 , ,1 ,2 , ,1 ,2 , ,1 ,2 ,  , ,..., , , ,..., , , ,..., , , ,...,G T D S
G T D S
G G G N T T T N D D D N S S S N
V V V V V
v v v v v v v v v v v v
    

.   (2.1) 
 
The components of civil infrastructure can also be classified topologically in point elements and 
linear elements.  As an example, Figure 2.2 shows the typical inventory of a potable water network 
(ALA 2002).  The potable water network supports residential, commercial, industrial and other users 
by providing the key functions of generation, storage, transmission and distribution through linear 
elements (e.g., pipelines, tunnels, canals and flumes), and point elements (e.g., reservoirs, treatment 
plants, tanks, pumping stations, wells and junctions).  The set V  has heterogeneous nodes consisting 
of both point and linear elements.  The links in set E  connect nodes in set V  and represent 
connections between couples of typically heterogeneous nodes. 
 
2.4 Models of network topology for different granularities 
 
Civil infrastructure typically extend over large areas and they are generally characterized by a large 
number of components.  The study of their reliability and resilience requires a proper definition of the 
network resolution in the modeling phase.  On one hand, a detailed representation of the network is 
possible at the cost of a great amount of input data (which are often scarce especially in the aftermath 
of a damaging event) and large computational costs.  On the other hand, a simplified (or skeletonized) 
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Figure 2.2.  Typical inventory of a potable water network.  Adapted from ALA (2002). 
 
representation of the network requires less detailed input data and has smaller computational costs, 
but at the possible expense of the accuracy of the analyses.  Figure 2.3 illustrates different network 
topology models for different granularities.  Consistently with the adopted formulation, let us define 
( , )G V E    as the 
th  subgraph, or subnetwork of G , such that: i) V V  ; ii) E E  , and iii) 
1    , with   equal to the total number of subnetworks of G .  Considering a specific set of 
nodes V , the subnetwork of G  induced by the set V  includes all the links between the nodes in 
V  and can be defined as ( , )G V E V     . 
 
Starting from the detailed network G  it is possible to obtain a skeletonized network G  by dividing 








 ;   (2.2) 
 
ii)    , 1,..., ,  i jV V i j i j     .   (2.3) 
 
Each one of the   subnetworks can be considered as an equivalent node.  The geographic area 
served by each equivalent node is defined as tributary area.   
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Figure 2.3.  Network topology and corresponding tributary areas for detailed and skeletonized 
networks. 
 
The collection of tributary areas is defined as the network footprint and it characterizes the spatial 
extension of the network.  The set of equivalent nodes of the skeletonized network can be expressed 
as 1 2, ,...,V V V V    .  The set of   links 1 2( , ,..., )E e e e  of the skeletonized network is 
composed by the subset of links that connect the different subnetworks.  If a connection exists 
between subnetworks iV  and jV ,   , 1,...,i j  , i j , the link between them is given in nodal 
notation by ,ij i je V V E   
.  The sets of nodes V and links E  define the topology of G , the 
skeletonized representation of the detailed network G . 
 
The adoption of a skeletonized network may affect the accuracy of the network reliability and 
resilience analysis.  A skeletonized network may be unable to capture the changes over time and 
space in the network capacities and demands following a damaging event, and the multiple 
dependencies and interdependencies with other networks.  The accuracy of the analysis depends on 
i) the number of subnetworks (or equivalent nodes), and ii) the criteria adopted in the subnetworks 
definition.  In civil engineering application, the grouping criteria could be based on, for example, 
available zoning, distinguishing them in residential, commercial and industrial zones.  The number 
of nodes within each subnetwork is variable and changes between subnetwork and subnetwork 
(equivalent nodes). 
 
 13  
Let us consider a generic subnetwork G  of G  and a generic quantity of interest Q  for the nodes 
V .  Examples of Q  are the generated or distributed flow of goods and services, or other measures 
related to the amount and quality of the goods and services provided by the infrastructure.  In general, 
the quantity of interest may be time-dependent: ( )Q Q t .  The optimal grouping strategy should 
minimize the variance of the quantity Q  within the considered subnetwork or equivalent node (since 
the equivalent node will give a value that is the spatial average over the subnetwork and any 
variability would be lost) and maximize the variance of the quantity Q  between different 
subnetworks (if the variability is small two subnetworks could be merged into a larger one).  In this 
dissertation, I propose the use of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess the accuracy of the 
grouping strategy of an existing skeletonized network and develop an optimal skeletonization 
procedure.   
 
Let us consider   subnetworks G V  , 1,...,  , each one composed by N  nodes.  In 
general, N  is different between subnetworks.  Let us assume that the quantity of interest Q  is 
defined for each node within each subnetwork, as 
,1 ,2 ,[ , ,..., ]NQ Q Q Q     , 1,...,  .  The 
ANOVA evaluates the difference in the mean values of the quantity Q  for the different subnetworks, 
decomposing the total variation in two parts:  
i) The variation of the mean value of Q  in subnetwork  , Q , from the overall mean value of 
Q , Q , considering all the subnetworks (Between Subnetwork Variability, BSV ); and  
ii) The variation of the values of Q  within subnetwork  , ,iQ , from the mean value of Q , Q
, in that subnetwork (Within Subnetwork Variability, WSV ). 
 
The ANOVA decomposes the total sum of squares (TSS ) in two terms: the sum of squares due to 
the BSV  ( BSS ) and the sum of squares due to the WSV  (WSS ) 
 
     
2 2 2
, ,




TSS BSS WSS N Q Q Q Q Q Q
   
    
      
          .  (2.4) 
 
Dividing the BSS by the corresponding degrees of freedom it is possible to obtain the mean squared 














    (2.5) 
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where 1   are the degrees of freedom in the BSS .  Similarly, dividing the WSS  by the 
corresponding degrees of freedom it is possible to obtain the mean squared term due to WSV  















   
  
 
    (2.6) 
 





 , that is the total number of 
nodes in the original detailed network.   
 
A high value of BMS  indicates that different subnetworks capture different values of Q , suggesting 
that a smaller number of subnetworks (or equivalent nodes) should not be used in the skeletonization 
process.  At the same time, a small value of WMS  indicates that for the estimate of Q  the equivalent 
node is representative of the nodes included in the subnetwork considered, suggesting that further 
subdividing the specific subnetwork is not needed.  A ratio between BMS  and WMS  larger than 1 
indicates that the variability of Q  between subnetworks is higher than the variability of Q  within 
subnetwork.  That is a characteristic of properly designed skeletonized network.  The ANOVA 
allows the evaluation of this ratio through a test statistic that has an F-distribution with 















   (2.7) 
 
If the p-value for the F-statistic is smaller than a user defined significance level (typically 0.05 or 
0.01), then the test rejects the null hypothesis that the mean values of Q  for all the subnetworks are 
equal.  The ANOVA can be used to assess whether a skeletonized representation ( , )G V E  of a 
network is a fair representation of the detailed network ( , )G V E .  It is important to underscore that 
the initial detailed network ( , )G V E  with the entire set of nodes and links is needed in evaluating 
the BMS  and the WMS .  This may limit the application of ANOVA in the field of civil 
infrastructure, when the set of available information is limited.  In those cases, however, the ANOVA 
principles may be used to i) validate a skeletonized model through local refinement (requiring a new 
set of detailed information) of specific equivalent nodes of interest, ii) as a relative measure between 
different levels of skeletonization, and iii) to develop general guidelines applicable as best-practice 
to cases where data on the details network are not available. 
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Two additional comments apply to the model granularity.  First, the quantity of interest Q  may 
vary over time, especially in the aftermath of a damaging event.  As a consequence, the ANOVA 
should be performed at each time step of the recovery process to assess whether the initial 
skeletonized model (derived under undamaged conditions) is adequate to capture the response of 
the damaged network.  Second, the definition of the tributary areas and hence of the model 
resolution is based on the values of the quantity of interest Q , that typically captures engineering 
measures of interest (e.g., pressure met at the demand nodes of a potable water network).  
However, the quantity of interest Q   may also capture societal characteristics of interest (e.g., age, 
income, race, etc.), resulting in the definition of tributary areas serving homogeneous population, 
in terms of societal characteristics. 
 
2.5 Definition of the state variables of the infrastructure components 
 
Once we defined the resolution of the model, we need to estimate its capacity and demand.  
Following the approach in Jia et al. (2017) and Jia and Gardoni (2018), to model the response of 
an infrastructure during its entire service life (including the impact of a damaging event and its 
recovery), let us define the vector of state variables ( , )iv tx  of node iv  at time t  for each element 
of set V  as a set of basic variables that define the component of the infrastructure, such as material 
properties, member dimensions, structural properties, imposed boundary conditions.  Following 
Jia and Gardoni (2018), the state variables can be modeled as  
 
      0, , , ;i i xv t v t t   x x x Z Θ ,   (2.8) 
 
where 0 ( ) ( 0)iv t x x  is the vector of the state variables of node iv  at a reference time 0t  , xΘ  
is a vector of model parameters of the state model and { ( )}tZ  is the sequence of vectors of external 
conditions or variables ( )tZ  occurring from time 0t   to time t .  The vector ( )tZ  might be 
portioned into environmental conditions or variables that influence the gradual deterioration over 
time of x , denoted as ( )tE , and shock intensity measures (e.g., the characteristic of possible 
damaging events) that influence the shock deterioration, denoted as ( )tS .  More details about the 
definition of gradual and shock deterioration can be found in Kumar et al. (2009, 2015), and Kumar 
and Gardoni (2012, 2013, 2014a, 2014b).  Hazard-specific models can be used to generate maps 
of the intensity measures of interest.  At time 0t   the initial values for the state variables of the 
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generation, storage, transmission and distribution nodes are defined.  Information on the 
population living in the tributary areas served by each node is also included as a state variable for 
the distribution nodes DV  to obtain the initial amount of goods and services requested to the 
infrastructure.  The amount of good and services is proportional to the population served by the 
infrastructure, namely the population living in the tributary areas.  More details on the procedure 
to assign the population to a specific tributary area can be found in Rosenheim et al. (2017, 2018). 
 
Following the taxonomy defined in Section 2.3, it is possible to classify the state variables 
according to the category of the node, resulting in category-specific state variables models, defined 
as follows: 
 
        , , ,0 , ,  , : , , , ;i i i iv t v t v t t                xx x x x Z Θ , (2.9) 
 
where ,0 ,( )iv x  is the vector of the state variables of node ,iv  of category   , at a reference 
time 0t  , the set   includes the categories of the node (i.e., generation, storage, transmission and 
distribution), , , ,{ ( )} { ( ); ( )}i i it t t  Z E S  is the sequence of vectors of external conditions or 
variables occurring from time 0t   to time t  that have an impact specifically at the site of node 
,iv , and xΘ  is the vector of the parameters of the state variables model for nodes of category  . 
 
2.6 Models of capacity and demand at the component level 
 
Based on the state variables ( , )iv tx  introduced in the previous section, and on the characteristics 
of the hazard, we can model the capacity and demand of each component of the considered 
infrastructure.  The capacity of a component is defined as the maximum value of a quantity of 
interest (e.g., a load or deformation) that the component can sustain without failure.  The demand 
of a component is defined as the actual value of the quantity of interest imposed to the considered 
component by a hazard.  Capacity and demand models for each category of nodes can be written 
as 
 
   , ,: , ;i cc t c v t       x Θ ,  (2.10) 
 
     , ,: , , ;i dd t d v t t        x S Θ ,  (2.11) 
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where , ,[ ( , ); ]i cc v t   x Θ  and , ,[ ( , ), ( ); ]i dd v t t    x S Θ  are the category-specific capacity and 
demand models, ,c Θ  and ,d Θ  are their vectors of model parameters, and ( )tS  is the vector of 
category-specific shock intensity measures.  The capacity and demand models in Eq. (2.10) and 
Eq. (2.11) can follow the general form for probabilistic predictive models proposed by Gardoni et 
al. (2002, 2003), here briefly recalled.   
 
Following Gardoni et al. (2002, 2003) a generic probabilistic predictive model can be written as 
 
   ˆ( , ) ( ) ( , )T T T TT Y T y     r Θ r r θ   (2.12) 
 
where ( )T   is a transformation function, ( , )TY r Θ  is the predicted quantity of interest (e.g., the 
component capacity or demand), ˆ( )y r  is an existing deterministic model to predict Y ; ( , )T r θ  
is a correction term used to improve the prediction capturing the bias in ˆ( )y r .  Both ˆ( )y r  and 
( , )T r θ  are typically constructed based on the rules of physics and mechanics.  The vector r  is a 
vector of basic variables that influence the quantity of interest Y , ( , )T T TΘ θ  is a vector of 
unknown model parameters that needs to be estimated; and T T   is the model error.  Three 
assumptions are at the basis of the transformation ( )T  , within the range of the data used to 
calibrate the model: the model error T T   is modeled as an additive term (additivity assumption), 
the standard deviation T  of the model is assumed not to depend on r  (homoskedasticity 
assumption) and T follows a standard normal distribution (normality assumption).  The predictive 
model in Eq. (2.12) takes advantage of both the governing rules of physics and mechanics and 
empirical information.  Statistical tools can be used in the model calibration to provide the most 
accurate predictions, as for example a stepwise deletion process (Gardoni et al., 2002) to construct 
a predictive model in which ( , )T r θ  includes only the most significant terms that contribute to 
the prediction of Y . 
 
A Bayesian approach can be used for the estimate of the vector of the unknown model parameters 
TΘ , combining the prior information about TΘ  with additional information, obtained from the 
observed data.  Within the Bayesian approach, the statistical uncertainty in the estimates of TΘ  is 
captured through its posterior probability density function (PDF), ( )Tf Θ .  A Bayesian approach 
can also be used to further update the probabilistic models as new data become available (Gardoni 
et al., 2003; Choe et al., 2007; Gardoni et al., 2007).  Furthermore, Tabandeh and Gardoni (2015) 
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developed a Bayesian hierarchical approach that accounts for the statistical dependence of 
clustered data.  In the calibration of the probabilistic capacity and demand models, one can use 
both the real data (i.e., data from laboratory tests or field measurements) (Gardoni et al., 2002, 
2003; Zhong et al., 2009), and virtual data (i.e., computer simulations) (Gardoni et al., 2003; Zhong 
et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2010).  An experimental design can be used to define the most 
informative cases to test or run (for a given number of tests/runs) and reduce the statistical 
uncertainty (Huang et al., 2010; Tabandeh and Gardoni, 2015).  Examples of capacity and demand 
models for components of transportation networks can be found in Gardoni et al. (2002, 2003), 
Choe et al. (2009, 2010), Huang et al. (2010, 2014), Bisadi et al. (2011, 2012), Kumar and Gardoni 
(2012, 2014b), Sharma et al. (2014, 2015), Tabandeh and Gardoni (2014, 2015); examples of 
models for components of power network can be found in Mardfekri and Gardoni (2013) and 
Mardfekri et al. (2015). 
 
Based on the model of capacity and demand in Eq. (2.10) and Eq. (2.11), fragility functions and 
repair rate curves are used to express the likelihood of damage or failure of components.  For point 
elements, fragility functions give the conditional probability of attaining or exceeding a prescribed 
performance level for given shock intensity measures at the site, which are included in , ( )i tS .  
For linear elements, repair rate curves provide the number of expected repairs per unit length of 
the linear element as a function of the intensity measures at the site.  Gardoni et al. (2002) and 
(2003) defined physics-based fragility functions by introducing a limit-state function 
( ) ( ) ( )g t c t d t    .  Different nodes in each category   have, in general, different limit-state 
functions ( )g t .  The model form is generally the same, but the models of capacity ( )c t  and 
demand ( )d t  include node-specific information from the values of the state variables ( , )iv tx , 
function of ,{ ( )}i tZ .  A reliability analysis (Ditlevsen and Madsen, 1996; Gardoni, 2017) can then 
be carried out to estimate the conditional probability of failure (fragility) at time t as 
 
     , 0 ,F t P g t t          S Θ S Θ ,  (2.13) 
 
where , ,( ; ; )c d   xΘ Θ Θ Θ  includes the parameters of the state variables model and of the 
corresponding capacity and demand models and ( )tS  is the vector of external conditions or 
variables occurring at time t  that have an impact specifically on nodes of category  .  Following 
the approach in Gardoni et al. (2002), we can compute the point estimate of the fragility as 
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ˆˆ[ ( )] [ ( ); ]F t F t  S S Θ  where 
ˆ
Θ  is a fixed value of Θ .  To account for the uncertainties in 
, Gardoni et al. (2002) also defined a predictive estimate of the fragility as 
[ ( )] [ ( ); ] ( )F t F t f d     S S Θ Θ Θ , where ( )f Θ  is the probability density function (PDF) of 
Θ .  To explicitly express the effect of the statistical uncertainty in the model parameters, 
approximate confidence bounds can be computed by first order analysis (Gardoni et al., 2002).  
Confidence bounds are built based on the reliability index   ,t    S Θ .  With reference to the 
conditional fragility in Eq. (2.13) it is defined as 
 
    1, Φ 1 ,t F t           S Θ S Θ   (2.14) 
 
where  1Φ   represents the inverse of the standard normal cumulative probability.  We can 
express the bounds on the reliability index considering, for example, one standard deviations away 
from the mean, as [ ( )] [ ( )]t t   S S , where 
1[ ( )] Φ {1 [ ( )]}t F t 
 S S  and [ ( )]t  S  is the 
standard deviation of   ,t    S Θ .  The variance 
2[ ( )]t  S  can be obtained by a first-order 
Taylor series expansion around the mean point 
Θ
M  with the following approximation: 
 
     2
T
t t t
      
              Θ Θ Θ ΘS S S  (2.15) 
 
where [ ( )]t
 
Θ S  is the gradient row vector of   ,t    S Θ  at the mean point and  Θ Θ  is 
the posterior covariance matrix.  The bounds of the fragility estimate, approximately 
corresponding to 15% and 85% probability levels, can be expressed on the probability space as 
 
          Φ ,  Φt t t t                         S S S S  (2.16) 
 
From the fragility functions, we can obtain the probability of failure at time t  as a point estimate 
or a predictive estimate (Jia et al., 2017; Jia and Gardoni, 2018) 
 
       ˆ ˆfP t F t f t d t          S S S ,  (2.17) 
 
       fP t F t f t d t          S S S .  (2.18) 
Θ
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Repair rate curves have been used to estimate the number of leaks and breaks in linear elements, 
e.g. pipelines (e.g., ALA, 2001; O’Rourke and Ayala, 1993; O’Rourke and Deyoe, 2004).  
However, the number of ruptures in a linear element depends on the location and on the spatially 
variable external conditions and does not have stationary increments along the linear element; 
therefore, at a given time t  and for a given segment of length s , I propose to model the number 






























where ( , )s t   is the temporal and spatial dependent repair rate, r  is the realization of the random 
variable R  and s  is the local coordinate along the linear element; the number of ruptures in any 
spatial interval along the linear element depends on the location of the interval, as 
 
      , , ,
s s
s




   . (2.20) 
 
Repair rates provide an estimate of the expected number of ruptures per unit length, given the 
occurrence of certain intensity measures ( , )t sS , for the given set of state variables x  of the 
considered node ,iv V   
 
         ,0 ,, , ; , , , ;i xs t t s v t t s          S x x Z Θ . (2.21) 
 
where ( , )t sS  and { ( , )}t sZ  show the dependency of ( , )s t  on the vector of external conditions 
or variables occurring at time t  at location s  of the linear element of category  .  Following the 
formulation in Gardoni et al. (2002) for the definition of point and predictive fragilities, we can 
define point and predictive repair rates as 
 
         ,0 , ˆˆ , , ; , , , ;i xs t t s v t t s          Z x x Z Θ . (2.22) 
 
           ,0 ,, , ; , , , ;i x x xs t t s v t t s f d            Z x x Z Θ Θ Θ . (2.23) 
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Once the repair rate has been defined, the probability of failure of the node consisting in a linear 
element can be calculated expressing capacity and demand of the node ,iv V   as a function of 
the numbers of ruptures in the considered node ,iv . 
 
2.7 Models of capacity and demand at the network level 
 
The models in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.11) are at the single component scale.  Capacity and demand 
models at the network-scale are needed to assess the reliability and resilience of the entire 
infrastructure.  I express the capacity of the entire network as 
 
   : ; CC t C t   X Θ ,  (2.24) 
 
where [ ( ); ]CC tX Θ  is the network capacity model,  1 2( ) ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )Nt v t v t v tX x x x  is the vector 
of the state variables of the N  nodes of the network G , and ,1 ,2 ,[ , ,..., ]C c c c Θ Θ Θ Θ  is the vector 
of the model parameters of the   capacity models.  Similarly, I express the demand imposed by 
a damaging event on the system as 
 
     : , ; DD t D t t   X S Θ ,  (2.25) 
 
where [ ( ), ( ); ]DD t tX S Θ  is the demand model, and ,1 ,2 ,[ , ,..., ]D d d d Θ Θ Θ Θ  is the vector of the 
model parameters of the   demand models.  The characterization of the network failure is 
extremely challenging and the topic of the next chapter, with the introduction of connectivity and 
functionality measures to capture the network failure in topology and flow based approaches.  In 
general, the network failure may be due to the combination of several modes.  The capacity and 
demand models in Eqs. (2.24) and (2.25) can follow the general multivariate form proposed by 
Gardoni et al. (2002, 2003) and I can express the limit-state function of the th  failure mode of the 
network as 
 
     , ,, , , , 1, ,C Dg t C t D t                  X Θ X Θ X Θ , (2.26) 
 
where ,[ ( ), ]CC t X Θ  is the capacity model associated with the 
th  failure mode of the network, 
,[ ( ), ]DD t X Θ  is the corresponding demand model; and , ,( , )C D  Θ Θ Θ , with ,C Θ  and ,D Θ  
are the vectors of the model parameters of the   capacity and demand models associated with 
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the th  failure mode of the network, respectively.  Based on Eq. (2.26), considering all the failure 
modes, I can write fragility curve at the network level as 
 
      , , 0 ,F t P g t t 

 
        
 
S Θ X Θ S Θ , (2.27) 
 
where 1 K( , ,..., ,..., ) XΘ Θ Θ Θ Θ , XΘ  is the vector of the parameters of the state variables model 
of the N  nodes of the network G , and ( )tS  is the vector of external conditions or variables 
occurring at time t .  The models adopted here take as input the states variables of all the nodes 
iv V  of the considered network G  and include the time dependency.  These models can be 
adopted in the network reliability analysis to predict the reduction or loss of functionality of a 
network using topology and flow-based approaches, as described in the next chapter. 
 
2.8 Recovery of the physical infrastructure 
 
The recovery of physical components can be estimated with empirical recovery functions (e.g., 
FEMA, 2003).  However, empirical recovery functions are typically based on significant 
assumptions, do not reflect the actual construction phases of a recovery, and consider the recovery 
of a single component without accounting for the overall regional recovery.  Sharma et al. (2017) 
and Sharma and Gardoni (2018) proposed a general state-dependent stochastic formulation that 
models the recovery of state variables as a function of the improvement influencing factors such 
as the component initial state and improvement resources.  Following Sharma et al. (2017), it is 
possible to model state variables during the implementation of the improvement strategies as 
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      
 
   x x 1 x 1 , (2.28) 
 
where ( , )iv x  is the vector of the state variables of node iv  at relative time  , measured from the 
beginning of the improvement and , 1( , )i rv  x  is the vector of state variables of node iv  after 
completing the improvement of a specific damaged (sub-)component of node iv  at time , 1r   .  As 
a special case ,0( , )i rv x  is the vector of state variables of node iv   at the beginning of improvement, 
whose probability distribution is obtained from the deterioration models (see e.g., Jia and Gardoni, 
2017, 2018).  In Eq. (2.28) { }A1  is an indicator function, defined such that { } 1I 1 , if I  is a true 
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statement, and { } 0I 1 , otherwise.  Finally, ,( , )i sv x  is the state change due to the occurrence 
of a disrupting shock at time , , 1 ,( , )s r r     . 
 
To develop a physics-based recovery function, Sharma et al. (2017) proposed to use the estimate 
of ( , )iv x  during the recovery process.  As different components recover after a damaging event 
that calls for repairs or reconstruction, the entire network also recovers.  Physics-based recovery 
functions are developed based on the actual sequence of recovery activities, taking into account 
the available resources, and the rate and prioritization of their mobilization.  As shown in Gardoni 
et al. (2007), physics-based recovery functions can also be updated with a Bayesian approach to 
incorporate field data as they might become available.  For each time step and for each considered 
component, the state variables ( )tX  are updated.  The values of ( )tX  during the recovery can be 
used in the component and network capacity ( )C t and demand ( )D t .  The functionality of the 





CHAPTER 3: TOPOLOGY AND FLOW-BASED APPROACHES  
3.1 Topology-based approaches 
 
In this section of the chapter, I present topology-based approaches to assess the reduction or loss 
of functionality over time for each damaged physical infrastructure.  Topology-based methods rely 
on measures of connectivity.  System network fragilities are introduced to assess the response of 
the damaged infrastructure, at the time of the considered shock event ( )tS  and throughout the 
entire recovery time.  In a topology-based network analysis, the failure of a component (both 
directly and indirectly, by propagation of the cascading effects) corresponds to a possible change 
in the network connectivity between some nodes and the rest of the network.  It is possible to 
assess the reliability of the entire network by considering measures of network connectivity in the 
definition of the limit-state function defined by ( )C t  and ( )D t .  Topology-based approaches are 
typically used with technological and social networks, focusing on the state of the network subject 
to a random or targeted attack (e.g. Albert et al., 1999, 2000; Crucitti et al., 2003; Lusseau et al., 
2003; Arianos et al., 2009; Schneider et al., 2011; Zhang and Chen, 2013, 2015)  Recently, 
applications of topology-based methods to physical networks subject to natural events have also 
gained relevance (e.g., Pitilakis et al., 2006; Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007a; Adachi and Ellingwood, 
2008; Kang et al., 2008; Guikema and Gardoni, 2009; Frangopol and Bocchini, 2012; Kurtz et al. 
2015; Guidotti et al., 2017a, 2017b). 
 
3.1.1 Measures of Connectivity: Diameter and Efficiency of the Network 
 
Networks can be distinguished based on measures of connectivity.  Two end-nodes are connected 
if there is at least one path between them with a finite number of links.  There are two typical 
measures of network connectivity in the literature: the diameter (or characteristic path length)   
and the efficiency  .  Both can be defined to describe the connectivity of a specific node to the 
other nodes in the network (nodal diameter and nodal efficiency) or to describe the overall network 
connectivity as an average of all of the nodal connectivity (global diameter and global efficiency). 
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 ,  (3.1) 
 
where ijd  ( , 1, , )i j N  is the length of the shortest path between nodes i  and j , i.e., the smallest 
sum of the link weights (e.g., distances) considering all the possible paths in the network between 
node i  and node j , (Latora and Marchiori, 2001).  The quantity in Eq. (3.1) can then be 
standardized by dividing it by the optimal nodal diameter ,i opt  that corresponds to an ideal network 
with a direct (single) link between each pair of nodes (complete graph): 
,/i i i opt   .  As a note 
about the nomenclature used in this paper, I use the word “standardized” to indicate that the 
considered metric is divided by a reference value.  To avoid a possible confusion, I do not use the 
word “normalized” here and keep this word to indicate a transformation that makes a variable to 
follow a Normal distribution.  In the case of an unweighted graph, , 1i opt  .  The standardized 
nodal diameter i  ranges from 1 to  .  It is equal to 1 when ,i i opt  , and higher values of i  
indicate some loss of connectivity with respect to the optimal case.  In the case node i  is 
disconnected from node j , it is not possible to find a path of finite length between the two nodes 
and ijd   .  As a result, i  and i  are equal to  .  However, we do not have information on the 
extent of loss of connectivity, in other words, whether just one node or a larger number of nodes lost 
their connection with node i . 
 
To address this issue, Latora and Marchiori (2001), introduced the efficiency  .  The nodal efficiency 
i  is defined as the average of the inverse of the shortest path between node i  and the other nodes of 
the network: 
 














  ,  (3.2) 
 
where 1/ij ijh d  for i j  and 0ijh   otherwise.  Unlike i , i  provides information also on 
the extent of the loss of connectivity.  When node i  is disconnected from node j , ijd    and, as 
a result, 0ijh  .  A larger number of 0ijh   in the summation in Eq. (3.2) reflects a larger number 
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of disconnections, resulting in a lower value of i .  The value of i  is between 0 (no links between 
node i  and the other nodes) and 1 (in the case of a complete graph).  As for the nodal diameter, i  
can also be normalized by dividing it by the optimal efficiency ,i opt  that is the nodal efficiency of 
a complete graph: ,/i i i opt   .  
 
Once i  and i  are defined for each node, we can characterize the connectivity of a set of 
components i  of the considered network with the local diameter  i  and local efficiency i  defined 
as the averages of the nodal measures of connectivity of the N
i
 components in set i .  
Mathematically they are written as 
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As for the nodal diameter and efficiency, local measures of connectivity can also be normalized 
by dividing them by the optimal diameter ,opt i  and efficiency ,opti  that are the local diameter and 
efficiency of a complete graph: 
,/ opt  i i i  and ,/ opt  i i i .  
 
We can then characterize the general connectivity of the network with the global diameter   and 
global efficiency    defined as the averages of the nodal measures of connectivity of the entire 
network.  They represent the average length of the shortest path between each pair of nodes in the 
network and the average of their inverse, respectively.  Mathematically they are written as 
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where   represents the average operator.  The properties of the nodal measures of connectivity 
apply also to   and  .  As before, both measures can be normalized with respect to the optimal 
measures of connectivity opt  and opt  of an ideal network with a direct (single) link between each 
pair of nodes (complete graph) to obtain / opt    and / opt   .  The values of ijd  and ijh  
needed to compute i  and i  can be obtained through the Dijkstra algorithm (Newman, 2001).  
The values of ,    i  and ,   i  can be obtained either by taking the averages of the i  and i  or, 
more efficiently when i  and i  have not already been computed, using the Floyd-Warshall 
algorithm (Gallo and Pallottino, 1988) to compute ijd  and ijh  for all considered pairs and then 
taking their averages. 
 
A reduction in the number of connections between nodes generally leads to an increase in   and 
a reduction in  .  In addition to the different numerical values of   and  , the two quantities have 
different meanings in the representation of the network connectivity.  Each value of   may 
correspond to different values of   and vice versa.  Specifically,     indicates a failure of the 
network (i.e., the overall network is divided into at least two separate clusters).  In this case, 
different values of   are possible reflecting the number of nodes that lost their connection with the 
rest of the network.   
 
3.1.2  Formulation of the Network Characteristics 
 
To provide an answer to the current limitations in network reliability the proposed formulation of 
network reliability builds on the current definitions of the network measures, integrating them with 
two further measures and modifying them with the introduction of the novel concepts of nodal 
weights and auxiliary nodes. 
 
3.1.2.1  Novel Measures of Connectivity: Eccentricity and Heterogeneity 
 
The measures i  and i  are the averages of the shortest paths and their inverse among node i  and the 
other nodes of the network.  Similarly, The measures   and   can be seen as the averages of the off-
diagonal elements of the matrices [ / ]ij optd Δ  and [ / ]ij opth Η , respectively.  They can be 
considered first order measures of connectivity.  However, since the values of i , i ,  i , i ,   and 
  give aggregate values of nodal and global connectivity, two networks could have the same values 
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of these quantities but with different variability in the off-diagonal elements of the matrices Δ  and Η
.  For examples, two networks, one with the same values of all of the ijd  and ijh  and a second one with 
significantly different values, could still have the same values of i  and i .  Similarly, we could have 
two networks with the same values of   and   but one with the same values of all of the i  and i  
and a second one with significantly different values of the nodal measures.  To capture this aspect, I 
introduce two novel second order connectivity measures, namely eccentricity  and heterogeneity 
.  The eccentricity   is defined as the standard deviation of the shortest paths between each pair of 
nodes in the network (standard deviation of elements 
ijd  in matrix Δ ).  The heterogeneity   is defined 
as the standard deviation of the inverse of the shortest paths between each pair of nodes in the network 
(standard deviation of elements 
ijh  in matrix Η ).  The eccentricity   describes the variability in the 
elements 
ijd  of matrix Δ .  While the diameter   provides an intuitive measure of the distance between 
each pair of nodes, the eccentricity  captures the fact that there may be pairs of nodes in close 
proximity, and other at large distance.  This is not a priori something bad, but a characteristic of the 
network connectivity that the diameter   only is unable to capture.  Similarly, the heterogeneity   
describes the variability in the elements 
ijh  of matrix Η .  While the efficiency   provides an intuitive 
measure of the network connectivity in even disconnected network, the heterogeneity  captures the 
fact that there may be pairs of nodes in close proximity, with 
ijh  close to one, and other at large distance 
or disconnected, with small or null values of 
ijh , respectively.  The efficiency   only is unable to 
capture this characteristic of the network connectivity.  Mathematically the second order measures of 
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 .  (3.12) 
 
It is important to underscore that for a generic undamaged network i , i ,  i , i ,   and   are 
not probabilistic means of random variables and i , i ,i ,  i ,   and   are not standard 
deviations of random variables, but they are statistical averages and standard deviations of the off-
diagonal elements of matrices Δ  and Η , respectively.  Appendix A provides a study on the 
information provided by the combination of first and second order connectivity measures 
considering circular (or convex) and radial network topologies. 
 
3.1.2.2  Measures of Connectivity with Link and Nodal Weights 
 
The formulation presented so far is based on the assumption that each node has the same 
importance.  However, in reality different nodes in a network typically have different importance 
(e.g., in a transportation networks nodes might be assigned an importance measure proportional to 
the population at that node).  To capture the nodal importance, I propose nodal weights ,N iw
( 1, , )i N  that are measures of the importance of node i .  The concept of nodal importance is 
indeed well established and usually captured in flow-based methods (e.g., Lee et al., 2007), 
defining the importance of the links as a function of their flows.  The advantage to use nodal 
weights in the connectivity metrics is to capture indirectly -in a topology-based approach- a 
simplified measure of flow, without performing a detailed flow analysis that may be network 
specific (introducing for example traffic, water or electric power flow models) and 
computationally expensive, as discussed in the next chapter.  
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Figure 3.1.  Examples of nodal-weighted networks. 
 
To clarify the meaning of nodal weights, I present the two examples in Figure 3.1.  In the first 
example (top left), I consider two cities at the same distance to a hospital but of different size (one 
of 5,000 and the other of 25,000 people).  In the second example (bottom left), I consider a city 
served by two power plants of different size (one generating 5,000 MWh and one 25,000 MWh).  
Both cases can be modeled with a hub and two connected nodes as shown in the right plot.  The 
larger city and power plant have intuitively a greater importance than the smaller city and power 
plant.  The proposed weights capture such relative importance.  In both examples, I can use 
,1 5,000Nw   and ,2 25,000Nw  .  To include nodal weighs in the measures of connectivity, I 
define an 1N   row vector ,[ ]N N jwW , and multiply each element of Δ  and Η  by the 
corresponding element of NW  (i.e., elements ijd  and ijh  of Δ  and Η  are multiplied by ,N jw  with 
, 1, ,i j N  and  j i ).  In the case of weighted networks, 
,i opt  , ,i opt , ,opt i , ,opti , opt   and opt  
represent the nodal, local and global diameter and efficiency measures in the optimal case of fully 
connected network (
ijd  and ijh  equal 1 for each i  and j ).  They are defined by the following 
expression: 
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This leads to the following expressions of the nodal-weighted diameters 
i  ,  i  and   , and 
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3.1.2.3. Auxiliary Nodes for Network Reliability Analysis 
 
In reality, often two connected nodes (i.e., with 1ija   in the adjacency matrix) are not connected 
by a single link but by a complex system of sub-links.  In this case, a link between the two end-
nodes could experience a partial loss of capacity due to failure of some, but not all, of the sub-
links connecting them.  However, current approaches typically adopt a single equivalent link 
formulation, placing a single link between the end-nodes.  In this case, different performance levels 
can be used to mimic indirectly the reduction in connectivity.  While this formulation is 
numerically efficient, it is not trivial to define the reduction in connectivity of the equivalent single 
link because it depends on the topology of the sub-links.  Therefore, it is more accurate to model 
directly the sub-links connecting two nodes.  In addition, a node may lose its importance in a 
network, for example the population associated to a node may dislocate in the aftermath of a hazard 
event.  To capture the actual complexity of links, and the possibility of having zero-weight nodes in 
the network, I introduce in this chapter a number auxN  of unweighted, or auxiliary, nodes.  The 
proposed auxiliary nodes model the actual connection constituting, de facto, a sub-network of 
unweighted nodes between weighted main nodes.  Because the auxiliary nodes do not have 
associated weight, there is a qualitative difference between them and the main weighted nodes.  
With the introduction of weighted measures of connectivity, a weight should be associated to each 
node.  However, this would limit the proposed formulation to networks of only weighted main 
nodes.  The introduction of unweighted, or auxiliary, nodes in the formulation allow one to use the 
equations obtained in the previous sections to calculate the measures of connectivity even in the 
cases where a refined description of the connection between two end nodes or the presence of an 
unweighted node is necessary.  Examples are the cases of multiple intersections between cities in 
a transportation network or of multiple junctions with no population and associated demand 
between demand nodes in a water network. 
 
The auxiliary nodes are introduced in our formulation by adding rows and columns to the matrices 
A and LW  to form a new ( ) ( )aux auxN N N N    adjacency matrix A  and a new 
( ) ( )aux auxN N N N    link-weight matrix LW .  I also calculate the new matrices [ / ]ij optd  Δ  
and [ / ]ij opth  H .  Their dimension remains N N , because they still refer to the shortest paths 
between the pair of the N  main weighted nodes, but their values 
ijd   ( , 1, , )i j N  and ijh  
( , 1, , )i j N  change, because of the presence of the auxiliary nodes and of the sub-links among 
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them.  Finally, NW  remains unchanged because the auxiliary nodes are unweighted.  The 
introduction of auxiliary nodes and sub-links provides a better characterization of the network 
reliability at the cost of a more complex network with higher computational burden.  Different 
strategies could be used to obtain the most accurate results with the minimum computational costs.  
For example, auxiliary nodes could be used only for some, but not all, of the connections with 
some connections still modeled using equivalent single links.  In an optimization study, equivalent 
single links could be used in preliminary analyses followed by more detailed analyses conducted 
using the proposed auxiliary nodes and sub-links.  
 
3.1.3 Assessment of the loss or reduction of functionality over time 
 
Topology-based approaches assesses the reliability and resilience of the network considering in 
the definition of the limit state function, as capacity and demand models, measures of network 
connectivity.  The information on the connectivity of a network G  is provided by the adjacency 
table ( )GA , as defined in the previous chapter.  The occurrence of a damaging event may result in 
the removal of network’s components, whereas the recovery of the network is associated to their 
restoration.  Removal and restoration of network’s components imply a variation over time in the 
adjacency table, 
( ) ( ) ( )G G tA A , in the matrices ( )tΔ Δ  and ( )tΗ Η , and consequently in the 
network’s connectivity measures: ( )i i t   , ( )t  i i , ( )t   , ( )i i t   , ( )t  i i , ( )t  
, ( )i i t   , ( )t  i i , ( )t   , ( )i i t   , ( )t  i i , ( )t   .  The proposed formulation 
allows to derive topology-based fragility estimates for a network, based on the measures of 
connectivity.  The first order and second order measures of connectivity capture at time t  the 
average values and variability of the connectivity within a given network, respectively.  These 
quantities are deterministically obtained in the pre-disturbance scenario through Eq. (3.19) to Eq. 
(3.30).  They become random variables after the occurrence of a disturbance (e.g., the occurrence 
of an earthquake).  The uncertainty comes from the unknown state of the individual links that 
might fail or not due to the occurrence of the disturbance.   
 
Component nodal fragilities can be developed for each node i  in the network to estimate the 
conditional probabilities of the following four events, given an intensity measure ( )tS  of the 
disturbance: i) whether the nodal diameter is on average larger than or equal to a specified desired 
threshold, i.e., 
,i( ) ( )i Trt t   ; ii) whether the nodal efficiency is on average smaller than or equal 
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to a specified desired threshold, i.e., 
,( ) ( )i Tr it t   ; iii) whether the nodal eccentricity is larger 
than or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., 
,( ) ( )i Tr it t   ; and iv) whether the nodal 
heterogeneity is larger than or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., 
,( ) ( )i Tr it t   .  When 
considering a single node i , therefore, I define the following three system nodal fragilities: 
 
            , , , ,; 0 , ,i Tr i i Tr i Tr i Tr iF t P g t t P t t t                          S Θ S S  (3.31) 
 
            , , , ,; 0 , ,i Tr i i Tr i Tr i Tr iF t P g t t P t t t                         S Θ S S  (3.32) 
 
     
          , , , , , , , ,
; 0
, , , ,i Tr i i Tr i i Tr i i Tr i Tr i Tr i Tr i Tr i
F t P g t t
P t t t t t           
       





Where ( ; ; )C D xΘ Θ Θ Θ  and xΘ is the vector of model parameters of the state variables of the N  
nodes of the network G .  The first two system nodal fragilities consider the measures of 
performance related to the elements ijd  (namely, the diameter and the eccentricity) and the 
measures of performance related to the elements ijh  (namely, the efficiency and the heterogeneity) 
separately.  The third system nodal fragility considers all the adopted measures of performance.   
 
Similarly, to consider the local performance of the components of set i , component local fragilities 
can be developed to estimate the conditional probabilities of the following four events, given an 
intensity measure ( )tS  of the disturbance: i) whether the local diameter is on average larger than 
or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., 
,( ) ( )Trt t  i i ; ii) whether the local efficiency is on 
average smaller than or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., ,( ) ( )Trt t  i i ; iii) whether the 
local eccentricity is larger than or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., ,( ) ( )Trt t  i i ; and 
iv) whether the local heterogeneity is larger than or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., 
,( ) ( )Trt t  i i .  When considering a set of components i , therefore, we define the following 
fragilities: 
 
            , , , ,; 0 , ,Tr Tr Tr TrF t P g t t P t t t                           i i i i i iS Θ S S  (3.34) 
 
            , , , ,; 0 , ,Tr Tr Tr TrF t P g t t P t t t                          i i i i i iS Θ S S  (3.35) 
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     
          , , , , , , , ,
; 0
, , , ,Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr
F t P g t t
P t t t t t           
       





Finally, to consider the overall network performance, component network fragilities can be 
developed to estimate the conditional probabilities of the following four events, given an intensity 
measure ( )tS  of the disturbance: i) whether the network diameter is on average larger than or equal 
to a specified desired threshold, i.e., ( ) ( )Trt t   ; ii) whether the network efficiency is on average 
smaller than or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., ( ) ( )Trt t   ; iii) whether the network 
eccentricity is larger than or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., ( ) ( )Trt t   ; and iv) 
whether the network heterogeneity is larger than or equal to a specified desired threshold, i.e., 
( ) ( )Trt t   .  At a network level, we can compute the following system network fragilities: 
 
            ; 0 , ,Tr Tr Tr TrF t P g t t P t t t                          S Θ S S  (3.37) 
 
            ; 0 , ,Tr Tr Tr TrF t P g t t P t t t                          S Θ S S  (3.38) 
 
     
          
; 0
, , , ,Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr
F t P g t t
P t t t t t           
       





Eqs. (3.31) to (3.39) are network system fragility surfaces.  They define the limit state as the 
conditional probability of attaining or exceeding a combination of first and second order 
connectivity measures thresholds.  For example, Eq. (3.37) defines the probability of failure as the 
conditional probability of the diameter ( )t   reaching a given threshold or the eccentricity ( )t   
reaching a given threshold.  As thresholds, percentage variations from the initial values in the 
undamaged scenario, may be considered.  Figure 3.2 provides a conceptual representation of the 
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Figure 3.2.  Top row: Concept of the system network fragility as in Eq. (3.37) (top row), Eq. (3.38) 
(central row) and Eq. (3.39) (bottom row). 
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The system network fragilities presented in Eqs. (3.31) to (3.39) define the limit state as the 
conditional probability of attaining or exceeding a combination of first and second order 
connectivity measures thresholds.  For example, with reference to Eq. (3.37), four cases can be 
observed: 
 
i) The diameter ( )t   and eccentricity ( )t   do not exceed given thresholds.  It reflects the 
fact that the connectivity of the network did not change considerably in the post-event 
scenario.  This can be considered a “no failure” case. 
ii) The diameter ( )t   exceeds a given threshold and the eccentricity ( )t   does not.  This 
case reflects the fact that the network has on average a large distance among nodes .The 
small variation of eccentricity reflects the fact that the entire network has similar values of 
( )ijd t , that have now values larger than in the undamaged scenario.  This can be considered 
a “failure” case. 
iii) The diameter ( )t   does not exceed a threshold but the eccentricity ( )t   exceeds a given 
threshold.  This reflects the fact that even if the increase in diameter is low, the higher value 
of eccentricity in the damaged scenario indicates that the shortest paths to reach different 
portions of the network may have values significantly different from that suggested by the 
diameter ( )t  , for example with portions of the network more damaged than others.  This 
can be considered a “failure” case. 
iv) Both diameter ( )t   and eccentricity ( )t   exceed a given threshold.  This case reflects a 
substantial increase both in the value of the shortest paths between couples of nodes, and 
in their variability throughout the network.  This can be consider a “failure” case. 
 
Conceptually similar considerations can be drawn for the efficiency ( )t  and heterogeneity ( )t 
, Eq. (3.38).  The most complete characterization is obtained considering all the four connectivity 




 39  
3.2 Flow-based approaches 
 
In this section of the chapter, I present flow-based methods to assess the reduction or loss of 
functionality over time for each damaged physical infrastructure.  Flow-based methods consider 
the specific flow of goods and services delivered by the considered infrastructure.  In a flow-based 
analysis, the failure of the network is not only a function of the network connectivity.  More 
generally, the failure of the network is associated to a reduction or loss of functionality, i.e. the 
damaged network is not able to provide a requested amount of goods and services from the 
generation nodes to the distribution nodes via the transmission nodes.  Flow-based methods track 
metrics of interest related to the flow of goods and services within the network.  For example, in 
the case of potable water infrastructure, a hydraulic analysis is conducted to obtain the values of 
the water pressure at the distribution nodes as a metric of interest. 
 
3.2.1 Models of network flow 
 
Let us define for the nodes of a network G  a mapping ( : )Vw V   that associates to each node 
desired values or weights.  In civil engineering applications, these values may provide information 
that capture a characteristic of interest for the specific node, as, for example, the population served 
by a distribution node (Guidotti et al., 2017a), or to the physical characteristics of a transmission 
node, such as length, material and diameter, in the case of a transmission node (e.g., a pipeline).  
Similarly, I define for links a mapping ( : )Ew E   that associates to each link desired values.  
In civil engineering applications, the mapping Ew  may correspond to the flow of goods and 
services from one node to the other.   
 
Let us define for each link of G  the flow   with the following mapping: 
 
  , ,0: ,  ,    ,m mm R e t e t mE e E t t t e t             .  (3.40) 
 
The flow  ( , )me t  of the generic link me  from node iv  to node jv  can be expressed as 
 [( , ), ]i jv v t , specifying the input ( iv ) and output ( jv ) node.  At each transmission node, and for 
each time step considered, the flow   satisfies the conservation condition: the sum of the flows 
afferent to a node is equal to the sum of the flows efferent from that node 
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     , 0 , ,, , : , , , ,T i T R T i T iv V t t t v t v t               .  (3.41) 
 
The value of the generated flow, given by the sum of the flows efferent from the generation nodes 
and from the storage nodes, if any, at time t , is equal to the distributed flow, given by the sum of 
the flows afferent to the distribution nodes and to the storage nodes, if any (equilibrium condition): 
 
     
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.  (3.42) 
 
Under normal conditions, civil infrastructure ensure the equilibrium condition, being able to satisfy 
the requested demand of goods and services, which may be daily or seasonally variable (e.g., 
considering the daily variability of the water demand in a potable water system; or of the traffic in 
a transportation system; or the electric power demand in an electric power system). 
 
3.2.2 Assessment of the loss or reduction of functionality  
 
In the aftermath of a damaging event, or due to aging and deterioration, the ability of the network 
to ensure the satisfaction of the imposed demands may be reduced.  The network may not be able 
to provide to the distribution nodes the requested amount of goods and services, even if generation 
and distribution nodes are connected.  For a generic distribution node ,D iv , a target flow 
, ,( , )D Tr D iv t  is not met if the sum ,( , )D D iv t  of the flows afferent to the distribution node ,D iv  is 
lower than the target flow 
 
     , , , ,, , , ,D D i D i D Tr D iv t v t v t       ,  (3.43) 
 
where  , , ,D Tr D iv t  ensures the amount of goods and services requested at the given distribution 
node.  The reasons of having at a generic distribution node a flow below its target, in the aftermath 
of a damaging event, may be one of the following: 
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i) A reduction or loss of functionality (due to direct damage or to cascading effects) of the 
generation or storage nodes may reduce the generated flow and, by equilibrium condition, 
the distributed flow; 
ii) A reduction or loss of functionality of the transmission nodes ,T iv  may result in a localized 
loss of flow ,T i  (e.g., a leak); and  
iii) The requested amount of goods and services at a specific distribution node may change not 
only as a function of the direct or indirect damage to the node, but also based on, for 
example, the population served by that node.  People assigned to a specific node may 
decide to dislocate or to relocate to a different node, changing the requested amount of 
demand flow, or target flow, , ( , )D Tr iv t  at a specific node.  
 
The variations in the generated and distributed flow depend on the generation, storage, 
transmission and distribution nodes of the network, and in particular on their state variables.  The 
reliability of the entire network can be assessed through system network fragilities, considering as 
the definition of the limit-state function the union of the events in which the distributed flow of 
goods and services at node ,D i Dv V  at time t  is lower than the target value (that is, at least one 
distribution node is not able to provide the target value of goods and services)  
 
            , , ,
1
; 0 , , 0
DN
D D i D Tr D i
i
F t P g t t P v t v t t 

 
           
 
S Θ S S . (3.44) 
 
3.2.3 Water systems specific models 
 
Flow-based approaches require network-specific models to capture the flow of goods and services 
delivered by the considered infrastructure.  In this section, the focus is on the potable water systems 
and therefore a greater level of detail is provided for water systems models, however similar 
considerations can be applied to other critical infrastructure, as electric power or transportation 
systems.   
 
Water systems (e.g., potable water, wastewater, and storm water systems) are regarded as "lifeline" 
infrastructure.  They support residential, commercial, industrial functions and other uses by 
providing water through five key subsystems: supply (ground and surface), transmission, treatment, 
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pumping, and storage of water.  Disruptions to any of these subsystems can disrupt community 
functions and cause cascading effects influencing the economy and general well-being of 
communities.  In past hazard events, water availability was crucial for minimizing the societal impact 
of such events and for recovery processes.  When water service outage is widespread, it can be just 
as disruptive to economic recovery as electricity loss, and the restoration of water service can be the 
tipping point for the recovery of business operations (Tierney, 1995, 1997a).   
 
The potable water system has, therefore, a critical role in the recovery of a community.  Its 
importance has drawn the attention of the scientific community in the past decades (e.g., Hwang 
et al., 1998; Chang et al., 2002; Shi et al., 2006; Wang, 2006; Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008; Wang 
and Au, 2009; Davis et al., 2012; Davis, 2014; Fragiadakis and Christodoulou, 2014; Chmielewski 
et al., 2016; Guidotti et al., 2016a).  To evaluate the water system loss and recovery of 
functionality, flow-based approaches incorporate a hydraulic model of the damaged water system.  
Models of capacity and demand at the single component level, and resulting fragility functions and 
repair rate curves, as presented in Chapter 2 allow capturing the physical damage in the aftermath 
of a damaging event.  Similarly, models of recovery allow restoring the network’s components 
during the recovery process.  However, a given water network component may lose or reduce its 
functionality not only as a consequence of direct damage, but also indirectly, as a cascading effect, 
consequence of the damage to a supporting component (e.g., a distribution node may not be able 
to meet a specific users’ demand because of the failure of the supporting generation node).  The 
next subsections present damage and recovery models for water systems, integrating the proposed 
models introduces in Chapter 2; then, I propose a functionality model to capture water specific 
functionality measures (e.g., pressure met, demand met, water quality at demand nodes) in a 
damaged network in the immediate aftershock and along the recovery process.   
 
3.2.3.1  Damage models 
 
A model of widespread damage of a water system depends on the hazard considered and on the 
specific vulnerability of the elements that constitute the system.  The diverse components of water 
systems are typically dispersed over large areas.  Water system components include linear 
components such as pipelines, tunnels, canals and flumes, and nodal components like tanks and 
reservoirs, treatment plants, pumping stations and wells.  Because of the variety of components, 
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water systems are vulnerable to a number of natural hazards and, in general, different elements are 
vulnerable to different hazards.  For example, earthquakes may cause damage to pipes that might 
result in breakage or leakage and pressure losses, and wind may damage above ground facilities 
like tanks, affecting system functionality.   
 
In Chapter 2, models of capacity and demand have been proposed to capture the damage status of 
network components through the development of fragility functions and repair rate curves.  
Fragility curves can represent damage to nodal elements using the conditional probability of 
exceeding a prescribed performance level for a given hazard intensity measure (e.g., Gardoni et 
al., 2003, 2003).  Likewise, repair rate curves may provide the mean rate of repair for linear 
components for a given hazard intensity measure (e.g., O’Rourke and Ayala, 1993: O’Rourke and 
Deyoe, 2004: ALA, 2001).  Differently to most water system damage models available in the 
literature, the proposed models consider both routine damage to system components (e.g., long-
term environmental effects, aging materials, or periodic mechanical failures), and disruptive 
hazard events.  However, they belong to a large body of research that focuses primarily on isolated 
component failures (e.g., Wagner et al., 1988; Ozger and Mays, 2003; Pathirana, 2010; Muranho 
et al., 2014).  While these models allow us to quantify the hydraulic importance of single elements 
in an otherwise functional system, the resulting information does not include hydraulic 
interdependencies, nor cascading effects, which are relevant for understanding the system state 
during hazard events.   
 
Fragility functions and repair rate curves have been adopted in recent water systems modeling 
software, such as GIRAFFE - Graphical Iterative Response Analysis for Flow Following 
Earthquake (Wang, 2006; Shi and O’Rourke, 2008) and MUNICIPAL - Multi-Network 
Interdependent Critical Infrastructure Program for the Analysis of Lifelines (Loggins et al., 2013).  
As for nodal components, pumps with a damage level corresponding to extensive damage or 
collapse are removed from the model and replaced with a linear element that allows water to flow 
through the node, with no additional static pressure head.  This modeling representation is meant 
to reflect the assumption that pump bypass lines allow flow due to pressure already in the pipes.  
Similarly, extensively damaged or collapsed tanks are removed from the hydraulic model and thus 
are no longer a water source for the system.  As for linear components, pipe damage in the water 
systems is categorized as either leaks or breaks, with different repair rate curves, as described in 
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Chapter 2.  Number and location of breaks and leaks along the pipe follow a Poisson process, with 
the mean value set to the repair rate.  A pipe leak is modeled as a fictitious pipe of cross-sectional 
area equal to the orifice (leak) area, with one end connected to the leaking pipe and the other end 
open to the atmosphere to simulate an empty reservoir.  For leaks, water loss is calculated based 









   (3.45) 
 
where 
fQ  is the volumetric flow, oA  is the orifice area, g  is gravitational acceleration, p  is the 
differential pressure between the pipe and the atmosphere, and 
w  is the specific weight of water.  
A check valve prevents backflow from an artificial reservoir.  A broken pipe is replaced with two 
pipes connected to artificial reservoirs with check valves.  The artificial reservoirs with backflow 
prevention allow the simulation of water loss due to pipe damage.   
 
3.2.3.2  Recovery models 
 
A review of literature pertaining to disaster recovery in water systems shows that there are far 
more studies of disaster mitigation and response than of recovery.  As water system component 
recovery is extremely challenging to model for hazard events, a large portion of the literature on 
the effects of disasters on water systems comprises white-papers, compilations of workshops 
proceedings and industry interviews (e.g., Grigg, 2003a, 2003b).  Tierney (1995, 1997) surveyed 
businesses to estimate the economic impact of water system recovery time in North American 
earthquake and flood events.  There is also a body of research that uses modeling to statistically 
predict (e.g., Zorn and Shamseldin, 2015), simulate (e.g., Bonneau and O’Rourke, 2009; Tabucchi 
et al., 2010), measure, or improve disaster recovery in water systems (e.g., Guidorzi et al., 2009; 
Alfonso et al., 2010), sometimes comparing model results with recovery times from a real world 
event (e.g., Tabucchi et al., 2010).  Functionality curves that assume linear recovery for each 
damaged component are commonly used to represent the rate of recovery in water system damage 
models (e.g., Gay Alanis, 2013).  Probabilistic restoration curves may be used, giving to each 
element a smooth recovery curve with a mean, standard deviation, and labor requirement for each 
damage level.  
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Since 1997, the HAZUS-MH software (FEMA, 2003) developed for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) has provided engineers and decision makers a tool to help estimate 
losses from seismic hazards and, in its most recent versions, from flood and hurricane hazards.  
For a water system, HAZUS-MH includes the damage fragility and repair rate curves based on the 
American Lifelines Alliance guidelines (ALA, 2001).  The curves in the guidelines were mainly 
based on available empirical data and expert judgement.  Implementing restoration curves for each 
damaged element independently, as in HAZUS-MH, necessarily neglects the inter- and intra-
system dependencies that determine the system’s actual recovery process.  Conditional fragility 
and recovery curves can be applied to propagate damage and determine the possibility of 
component recovery, based on supporting components within and outside the water system.  
Recovery modeling of dependent systems can be performed with binary dependencies and 
deterministic recovery times (e.g., Cavdaroglu et al., 2013, use mathematical programming to 
optimize component recovery scheduling), or with discrete simulations.  For example, graph-based 
dependency models of component recovery may use Petri nets (e.g., Luna et al., 2011) or repair 
scheduling with stochastic recovery times (e.g., Tabucchi et al., 2010).  As discussed in Chapter 
2, Sharma et al. (2017) and Sharma and Gardoni (2018) proposed a general state-dependent 
stochastic formulation that models the recovery of state variables as a function of the improvement 
influencing factors such as the component initial state and improvement resources.   
 
3.2.3.3  Functionality models 
 
Water system performance after hazard events depends upon the effects of damage on the water 
system, including maintaining adequate pressure to deliver water for potable usage and fire protection, 
and to prevent contaminant intrusion.  Hydraulic simulation of flow, pressure, and water quality of a 
damaged system at each demand node can contribute separately, or in combination with each other, to 
inform system performance metrics (e.g., volume of demand satisfied, quality of delivered water, 
pressure thresholds and, when no separate water system distribution system exists, pressure sufficiency 
for fire protection).  Therefore, hydraulic analysis is needed to model whether a system can supply 
sufficient quantity, pressure levels, and water quality for satisfying social functions (e.g., Bonneau and 
O’Rourke, 2009; Javanbarg and Takada, 2010; Tabucchi et al., 2010).   
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Models of the functionality of water systems can be broadly classified as demand-driven or 
pressure-driven.  Among the most widely used hydraulic simulation tools for water distribution 
networks is the demand-driven software package EPANET (Rossman, 2000), a freely available 
software package from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The software performs 
extended period steady-state simulation of hydraulic behavior and water quality.  However, demand-
driven hydraulic models such as EPANET are not suitable for modeling low-pressure situations, such 
as in damaged systems.  In demand-driven hydraulic models, the normal demand is assumed always 
satisfied.  If the pressure at a node is insufficient to satisfy a given demand, the solution engine raises 
negative pressure errors, and the analysis cannot be completed.  The hydraulic analysis of water 
systems under pressure-deficient conditions is an open research area (e.g., Todini, 2003; Piller 
and Van Zyl, 2009; Trifunovic, 2012).  The EPANET-EMITTER package developed by 
Pathirana (2010) uses emitters in an iterative pressure-driven adaptation of the EPANET solver.  
Emitters are openings (e.g., pipe leaks or breaks) that exit to the atmosphere at demand nodes to 
represent a pressure-dependent component of demand.  EPANET-EMITTER functions as 
additional code around the EPANET solver (or wrapper) that iteratively resets the emitter coefficients 
and reruns the model until the emitter coefficients and demands converge.  Sandia National 
Laboratories (SNL-NM) are currently active in the development of a pressure-driven software package 
for hydraulic analysis in damaged network (namely WNTR, Water Network Tool for Resilience, Klise 
et al., 2016; Moriarty et al., 2016).  The analyses in this dissertation use the EPANET-EMITTER 
software to estimate pressure-driven consumption because of its applicability to a large-scale 
extended-period simulation, and adapts and adds to the methodologies utilized in GIRAFFE to 
estimate leakage flows (Eq. 3.45).   
 
The possibility of cross-contamination resulting from pipe breaks, leaks, and low pressures in 
the network is a water quality concern that can be a significant problem in post-event system 
recovery.  Total coliform (e.g., E. Coli) tests can signal the possible presence of harmful bacteria, 
but there may be a considerable lag time before their detection.  Since residual chlorine can slow 
the growth of bacteria, chlorine levels from different areas of the network are often used to 
indicate local risk of contamination.  Most state regulations require water quality testing 
anywhere pressure falls below a minimum value that (depending on the state) varies between 
103 kPa and 138 kPa (15 psi and 20 psi) and issue boil water notices to require repeated testing 
until potentially harmful compounds are no longer detectable (USEPA, 2002; NJDEP, 2016).  
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The simplifying assumption of non-decaying, non-interacting chemicals for water quality 
modeling is adopted in some of the most common water distribution models with contaminant 
transport (Guidorzi et al., 2009; Alfonso et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2010).  Without the potential 
for decay, the non-decaying assumption corresponds to a worst-case contaminant propagation scenario 
(where contaminated water can only exit the system through demand nodes or flushing), and a 
conservative approach for protecting customers from potential contamination exposure.  Though water 
quality analysis in post-hazard recovery simulation is rare, there is a broad literature covering 
contaminant transport and water quality sensor placement for drinking water contamination events 
(e.g., Propato et al., 2005; Guidorzi et al., 2009; Alfonso et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2010, 2012).  While 
these studies do not include physical system damage, many use EPANET to track contaminant 
transport and decay, or the extension package, EPANET-MSX to model multiple contaminant species 
and their interactions with each other and with chlorine residuals.  These analyses can be used to 
improve recovery operations (such as valve closures and hydrant flushing) to limit the spread of 
contaminants (e.g., Guidorzi et al., 2009; Alfonso et al., 2010).  The current study defers operational 
changes during recovery to future work.   
 
Models of damage and recovery are integrated in a flow-based analysis to assess the pressure met, 
demand met, and water quality throughout the entire network, in the immediate aftermath of the 
damaging event and along the recovery process.  As the single components recover, also the entire 
system recover its functionality.  Therefore, for each time-step of the recovery process and for each 
considered component, the damage status is updated based on the initial damage status and its recovery 
functions.  Operational values are retrieved from the previous time-step.  A functionality analysis 
performed at each step tracks the value of the functionality metrics of interest.  The process is iterated 
until a desired level of functionality is met, typically considering a tolerance range from the baseline 
scenario.  Figure 3.3 sketches the conceptual reliability and resilience analysis with reference to a water 
system, based on the pressure at the distribution nodes, with the iterations between physical damage 
assessment and functionality analysis from the immediate aftermath of the damaging event 
0
( )t   to the 

















CHAPTER 4: MODELS OF INTERDEPENDENCIES 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The models presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 allow us to evaluate the physical state and the effect 
of the direct damage in terms of loss or reduction of functionality considering individual network.  
However, recent catastrophic events, such as the hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy (2012) and 
the earthquakes in Chile (2010), New Zealand (2010–2011), and the earthquake and tsunami in 
Japan (2011), have not only revealed the vulnerabilities of individual infrastructure systems, but 
also showed the importance of dependencies and interdependencies among infrastructure sectors.  
A disruption in one infrastructure may cause cascading effects, resulting in disruptions of 
dependent infrastructure and, more generally, degrading their functionality (Chang, 2014; 
Vespignani, 2010; Guidotti et al., 2016a, 2017b).  This section integrates the physical 
infrastructure as well as the social systems considering multiple dependencies and 
interdependencies. 
 
Communities consist of multiple interacting infrastructure systems, such as water and wastewater, 
electric power, and transportation systems.  Components of these systems are typically spatially 
distributed over large geographic areas.  A taxonomy of infrastructure’s components has been 
proposed in Chapter 2, based on the component’s functionality, distinguishing generation, 
transmission, distribution and storage components.  These systems are heterogeneous because they 
are constituted by elements of different types.  In addition, individual infrastructure systems are 
also typically significantly interconnected with each other.  The occurrence of hazard events may 
cause direct physical damage to several vulnerable components in a given network.  In addition, a 
disruption in one network may cause cascading effects, resulting in disruptions of dependent 
systems and, more generally, degrading the functionality of affected interconnected networks.   
 
In this Chapter, I first introduce five classes of (inter)dependency: physical, cyber, geographic, 
logical, and social.  I then present a multi-layered heterogeneous network model (in the remaining 
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of this chapter indicated as MHN model) to assess the cascading effects due to the multiple classes 
of (inter)dependency among critical infrastructure.  The MHN model takes into account that the 
components in each system are different (heterogeneity) and interconnected (interdependency).  
Different layers in the MHN model represent different types of dependency/interdependency.  The 
proposed multi-layered heterogeneous network model is general because any available models for 
the individual infrastructure systems can be adopted and any type of dependency/interdependency 
can be considered.  Furthermore, the proposed multi-layered heterogeneous network model can be 
used to extend the use of the existing topology and flow based functionality metrics to the study 
of the reliability and resilience of interdependent systems that are subject to natural and 
anthropogenic hazards.  
 
4.2 Classes of dependency/interdependency 
 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) defined four types of dependencies: physical, cyber, geographic, and logical.  
Physical dependency means that the state of one infrastructure system is dependent on the material 
outputs of another infrastructure system.  Cyber dependency means that the state of one 
infrastructure system depends on information transmitted through the information infrastructure.  
Geographic dependency means that a local environmental event can create state changes in two or 
more infrastructure systems.  Logical dependency is when the state of one infrastructure system 
depends on the state of others via a mechanism that is not physical, cyber, or geographic.  Going 
beyond the dependencies of physical infrastructure, Guidotti et al. (2018a), also considered the 
social dependency.  The population served by each distribution component ,D i Dv V  may change 
because of the human response to damaging events.  As examples of human response models, Lin 
(2009) and Rosenheim et al. (2017, 2018) obtain the probability of household dislocation due to 
the structural damage of residential buildings by a logistic regression model that also requirs 
demographic information.  Changes in the population lead to changes in the service demand at the 
corresponding distribution component.  It is also possible to differentiate between internal and 
external population dislocation to determine the change in population size and spatial distribution, 
with a direct impact on the state variable ,( , )D D iv tx  of the distribution components of the 
infrastructure.  External dislocation results in a reduction of the population size of a community; 
internal dislocation results in an increase of the population size at given assembly points (e.g., 
shelters, schools or gyms and large open areas), keeping a constant overall population. 
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Figure 4.1.  Pictorial representation of the multi-layered heterogeneous network (MHN) model. 
 
4.3 Multi-layered heterogeneous network model 
 
A MHN model has been proposed by Guidotti et al. (2017b, 2018b) to assess the probability of 
failure of a dependent component given the failure of a supporting component (of any category   
and belonging to any network) considering different classes of dependency/interdependency.  In 
this dissertation, the component failure corresponds to the loss or reduction of functionality of the 
considered component.  The main conceptual shift of an MHN model compared to current 
approaches is that all of the different components of the considered networks are modeled on the 
same conceptual “plane”, or level, with different levels describing the different classes of 
interdependencies (Figure 4.1).  An MHN model can account for network components that are of 
different categories and capture different classes of dependency between components.  The 
remainder of this section briefly summarizes the main elements of a MHN model. 
 
4.3.1 Augmented adjacency table 
 
Critical infrastructure are often composed by multiple systems.  Each one of them can be 
considered a block, or a community, according to the definition proposed by Fortunato (2010), as 
a subset of entities that share common properties and/or play similar role within the system of 
infrastructure.  For example, it is possible to include under the definition of community all the 
elements that belong to the same infrastructure (e.g., the water, the electric power, the 
transportation or the telecommunication system).   
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The MHN model builds on the concept of adjacency table previously introduced, introducing an 
augmented adjacency table.  In the case of K  systems of infrastructure, each infrastructure k  can 
be represented by a symmetric 
( ) ( )k kN N  adjacency table 
( ) ( )[ ]k kijaA , 1,...,k K , 
( )( , ;  , 1, , )ki j k i j N  .  Considering a general network system composed by K  networks, the 
augmented adjacency table A  is given by 
 
(1) (1, ) (1, ) (1, )
( ,1) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
( ,1) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
( ,1) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
y w K
y y y w y K
w w y w w K










A A A A
A A A A
A
A A A A
A A A A
. (4.1) 
 
The augmented adjacency table A  has the K  adjacency tables arranged along its diagonal.  Out-
of-diagonal tables are used to represent pairwise connections between components of different 
networks.  For example, considering two generic networks y  and w , the connections between 
components of the two networks is represented by the generally rectangular 
( ) ( )y wN N table 
( , ) ( , )[ ]y w y wijaA , where 
( , )y w
ija , ( , 1,..., )y w K , is either 1, if component i  of network y  is 
connected to component j  of network w , or 0 otherwise.  The connections are mutual, thus 
( , ) ( , )y w w y
ij jia a  and the augmented adjacency table is symmetric. 
 
4.3.2 Multi-layered dependency tables 
 
The augmented adjacency table provides the connections among the components of the networks 
in the system.  When subject to natural of anthropogenic hazard, some of these components may 
fail, compromising the reliability of the entire system.  In particular, a failure of one or more 
components of one infrastructure may affect another one, because of the interdependencies, with 
disruptive cascading effects (e.g., Buldyrev et al., 2010; Vespignani, 2010).  Guidotti et al. (2017b, 
2018b) introduced a dependency table D  to capture relations of dependency and interdependency 
among the components of the same network or of different networks.  Considering a system of K  
networks, we have along the diagonal the dependencies within a given network k : ( ) ( )[ ]k kijDD , 
1,...,k K , 
( )( , ;  , 1, , )ki j k i j N   where ( )k
ijD  ( )i j  is either 1, if components i  of network 
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k  depends on component j  of the same network k , or 0 otherwise, and 
( ) 0kiiD  .  The terms out 
of the diagonal represent the dependency between components of different networks: 
( , ) ( , )[ ]y w y wijDD , , 1,...,y w K , 
( )( , ;  , 1, , )ki j k i j N  , where 
( , ) 1y wijD  , ( )i j , indicates a 
dependency relation between component i  of network y  and component j  of network w .  Under 
this definition, the symmetry of D  holds true only when 
( , ) ( , ) 1y w w yij jiD D  , i.e., a mutual 
dependency (interdependency) exists between all the couples of components having a relation of 
dependency.  It is important to underscore that the dependency table D  herein defined is different 
from the augmented adjacency table A : (i) a connection between two components in table A  does 
not necessarily corresponds to a relation of dependency between them; and (ii) a relation of 
dependency in table D  may link two components even if they are not connected in table A  (e.g., 
the dependency may be not only physical).  Multiple classes of dependency/interdependency are 
possible among the components of systems of infrastructure.  Each class of 
dependency/interdependency establishes a different relation among components of the same 
infrastructure and between components of different infrastructure.  In that sense, the proposed 
model is a multi-layered model (Paul and Chen, 2016) and each class of interdependency can be 
represented as a different layer, with its own dependency table.  Let   be a generic class of 
dependency/interdependency, Guidotti et al. (2017b) proposed a multi-layered dependency table 
in the following way: 
 
(1), (1, ), (1, ), (1, ), 
( ,1), ( ), ( , ), ( , ), 
( ,1), ( , ), ( ), ( , ), 
( ,1), ( , ), ( , ), ( ), 
y w K
y y y w y K
w w y w w K
K K y K w K
   
   

   










D D D D
D D D D
D
D D D D
D D D D
. (4.2) 
 
where along the main diagonal, there are the tables 
( ), ( ), [ ]k kijD
 D , 1,...,k K , 1,...,  , 
( )( , ;  , 1, , )ki j k i j N   with ( ), kijD
  ( )i j  that is either 1, if there is a dependency of class   
between components i  and j  of network k , or 0 otherwise, and 
( ), 0kiiD
  .  Out of the diagonal, 
there are the generally rectangular 
( ) ( )y wN N table ( , ), ( , ), [ ]y w y wijD
 D , where 
( , ), y w
ijD

 is either 1, 
if there is a dependency of class   between component i  of network y and component j  of 
network w , or 0 otherwise.   
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4.3.3 Heterogeneity in multi-layered likelihood tables 
 
Focusing on the role of (inter)dependencies, we are interested in the conditional probability of 
failure of a component given the failure of a supporting component (cascading effect).  Let us 
consider K  different infrastructure, each one having   different categories of components.  For 
example, following the taxonomy discussed in Chapter 2, we may have different categories of 
components, i.e. generation, storage, transmission and distribution components.  Being constituted 
by components of different types, these systems are heterogeneous.  As described in Sengupta and 
Chen (2015), to analyze a heterogeneous network with the tools of homogeneous models result in 
loss of useful information, suppressing the category-information available in the data.  Different 
categories of components have different characteristics, vulnerabilities and probabilities of failure, 
both when they are considered independently, subject to direct damage, and when they are 
considered in a network, subject to cascading effects.  Moreover, the conditional failure of a 
component given the failure of a different component is also function of the class of dependency 
between the two components.  For a class   of dependency, Guidotti et al. (2017b) introduced the 
K K  likelihood table L  as   
 
(1), (1, ), (1, ), (1, ), 
( ,1), ( ), ( , ), ( , ), 
( ,1), ( , ), ( ), ( , ), 
( ,1), ( , ), ( , ), ( ), 
     
        

        














L L L L
L L L L
L
L L L L
L L L L
. (4.3) 
 
Table L  has along it main diagonal the   likelihood tables ( ), ( ), [ ]ywl
   L , where , 1,...,y w K
, 1,...,  , 1,...,   and ( ), ywl
 
 is the conditional probability of the failure of a component 
belonging to network y  given the failure of a supporting component of the same category   
belonging to network w , for dependency class  .  Out of diagonal, there are the tables 
( , ), ( , ), [ ]ywl
     L , where , 1,...,y w K , , 1,...,   , 1,...,  , and ( , ), ywl
  
 is the conditional 
probability of failure of a component of category  belonging to network y  given the failure of a 
supporting component of category   belonging to network w , for dependency class  . 
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In practical applications, the most challenging part is to calculate the entries of table L .  The 
conditional probability of failure of a component given the failure of another one may depend on 
the categories of both components, on the respective network of belonging, and on the class of 
dependency.  As a result, the entries of table L  are functions and their values depend on the 
considered components.  For example, let consider a geographical dependency.  Let ( , ), 
1
yB    define 
the failure of component 1 (of category   of network y ) and 
( , ), 
2
wB    the failure of component 2 
(of category   of network w ), under the geographical dependency class  .  Let 1u  and 2u  be the 
intensity measures of the considered hazard at the location of the two components.  I can write the 
probabilities of the two events as 
 
       
       
1
2
, , , , 
1 1 1 1 1
, , , , 





P B P B u f u du
P B P B u f u du
   









  (4.4) 
 
where
( , ), 
1 1( | )
yP B u   and 
( , ), 
2 2( | )
wP B u  are the conditional probabilities of exceeding of attaining 
a damage state of interest, for a given value of intensity measure (i.e. fragility functions).  To assess 




, I write the following expression: 
 
      
          
1 2
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1 2
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1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
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          , , ,
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yw
y w w w
u u
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 .  (4.6) 
 
Conditioning on 2u , 1u  and 





 become independent and the second term of the integral of Eq. 
(4.5) can be written as 
 
 










 ,  (4.7) 
 
where the joint distribution of the intensity measures includes information on the correlation 
between the two variables.  Conditioning on 1u , 












2u  and the first term of the integral of Eq. (4.5) can be written as in the first expression in Eq. 
(4.4). 
 
For a class of dependency of physical type, the value of the entry ( , )
ywl
   may not depend on the 
values of the intensity measure of interest, but on the state (i.e. failure/survival) of the supporting 
component.  For example, the failure of a generation component of water network in the case of a 
failure of a supporting generation component of the electric power network, corresponds to the 
probability of failure of the eventual backup power unit of the considered component (e.g., Kim et 
al., 2007).  For a class dependency of social type, the value of the entries of table L  may depend 
on the distribution of people in the aftermath of a damaging event, taking into account the human 
response and the decision of dislocate or relocate in the community, function of the structural 
damage of residential building (Lin, 2009, Rosenheim et al., 2018).  
 
4.3.4 Probability dependency tables 
 
Each component of a network has its own probability of failure, as discussed in Chapter 2.  For a 
generic class   of interdependency, I define a probability dependency table P  by attributing to 
each dependency of table D  the conditional probability of failure resulting from the likelihood 
table L .  The entries of table P  are ( , ),y wijp
 , 
( )( , ;  , 1, , )ki j k i j N  , namely the conditional 
probability of failure of a component i  of network y  given the failure of component j  of network 
w , taking into account the component categories and the class of dependency.  Tables D  and 

L  have different dimensions.  Following the approach in Sengupta and Chen (2015) to combine 
them I use a N  by K  membership table ,[ ]i km M , 1,...,i N , 1,...,  , 1,...,k K  with 
, 1i km    if component is of category  and belongs to network k ; N in this case is given by the 







 .  The membership table 
is used to map the K  by K  likelihood table into the N  by N  extended likelihood table 
T    L M L M .  The entries of 
L  are a function of the couple of dependent components, as 
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described in Section 4.2.3.  In this way 
   P D L .  Moreover, the entries of table L  are 
functions of time.  Values in L  could vary with time, capturing the fact that the value of the 
conditional probability of failure among dependent component could vary (e.g., due to 
deteriorations or other changes over time of the state variables of the network components).  
Similarly, the dependency relations in table D  may change over time and during the recovery 
process.  As a result, the the MHN model is a time-varying model, allowing a variation over time 
of the entries of tables ( )t
 D D  and ( )t
 L L , and, therefore, of ( )t
 P P . 
 
4.3.4.1  Multiple classes of dependency between same components 
 
Table P  refers to class   of interdependency.  Between the same two nodes, multiple classes of 
dependency may exist.  Defined, for a generic entry ( , ),y w
ijp
  of table P , B  as the event of failure 
of a node i  of network y  given the failure of node j  of network w , for class of dependency  , 
I can write ( , ), ( )y wijp P B
  , that is the probability of event B
 .  The elements of the probability 
dependency table ( , )[ ]y wijpP , considering   possible classes of interdependency, can be 
obtained by the inclusion-exclusion rule of the union of events 
 




1y wijp P B P B P B B P B B B
   
      
   


   
 
       
 
    (4.8) 
 
Under the assumption that failures due to different classes of dependency are statistically 




1( , ) ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ),
1 1 1
1y w y w y w y w y w y w y wij ij ij ij ij ij ijp p p p p p p
  
     
   


   
              (4.9) 
 
4.3.4.2  Multiple supporting components 
 
Table P  defines the probability of conditional failure of the components of the network system 
considering all the possible classes of interdependency.  However, the same component may have 
more than one supporting component, of different types and from different networks, and its failure 
may depend on the status of each one of them.  In particular, a component with more supporting 
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components has more redundancy and its failure due to cascading effect may change because of 
the failure of multiple supporting components.  Under the assumption that failures of different 
components are statistically independent events, in the case of failure of multiple supporting 
components, the entries of table P  can be obtained by the inclusion-exclusion rule of union of 





CHAPTER 5: PROBABILISTIC METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I propose a novel methodology to quantify the reliability and resilience of 
interdependent critical infrastructure, merging the probabilistic models presented in Chapter 2, the 
network-based approaches presented in Chapter 3 and the multi-level heterogeneous network model 
presented in Chapter 4 and taking into account the integration between physical infrastructure and 
social systems.  The probabilistic methodology presented in this Chapter is general and applicable 
to any dependent/interdependent networks subject to any natural or anthropogenic hazard.   
 
5.2 Definition of the footprint of the hazard and of each network 
 
First, for a given region of interest, we need to define the footprint of the hazard and of each 
network.  The footprint of the hazard and of each network might exceed the footprint of the 
region of interest.  The hazard and the different networks might have different footprints (Figure 
5.1).  The hazard footprint, in general, has to include the source of the hazard and may exceed 
the footprint of the network of interest.  The definition of each network footprint depends on 
four key factors: i) the type of information of interest (physical damage vs. loss of functionality); 
ii) the existence of easily-recognizable physical boundaries and possibility to model the 
boundary conditions; iii) the existence and location of strategic elements that need to be included 
like generation nodes (depending on the purpose of the analysis); iv) modeling of the damage 
propagation among physical infrastructure.   
 
Critical infrastructure typically extend over large areas, and are subject to multiple hazards.  In 
general, the vulnerability of infrastructure systems and their components varies with the type of 
hazard.  For instance, extreme wind events mainly affect the transmission and distribution towers 
and lines in electric power networks, while an earthquake may cause more damage to buried power 
lines, substations, and generation plants.   
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Figure 5.1.  Conceptual representation of the footprint of the hazard and of each network. 
 
In defining the footprint of the hazard, hazard-specific models need to be adopted to generate 
spatial maps of the intensity measures of interest ( )tS .  These include, but are not limited to, 
maps of peak ground values of acceleration, velocity and displacement (PGA, PGV and PGD, 
respectively) in the case of seismic hazard; maps of water depth and velocity or inundation 
duration for flood hazard; maps of wind speed for tornado and hurricane hazards. 
 
5.3 Definition of the resolution of the infrastructure model 
 
Once the footprint of a network is defined, we need to define its granularity (i.e., the resolution 
of the model).  In this chapter, I refer to a water network, but the concepts are general and can 
be applied to any network.  I define a tributary area as the area served by a single network node 
(Figure 5.2).  By changing the size of tributary area, I can define network models with different 
levels of granularity, as discussed in Section 2.4.  In the limit, the most refined model considers 
each single parcel (house lot) as the tributary area.  The nodal value of the quantity of interest is 
the spatial average over the tributary area.  In terms of modeling, different granularities affect 
the ability to describe: i) the spatial variability of the impact over the region of interest; ii) the 
changes in the network capacities and demands following a disrupting event; iii) the recovery 
process, since skeletonized networks include only main lines (not small distribution lines).   
 
 61  
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Conceptual representation of different network granularities. 
 
The inventory of the physical infrastructure is defined according to the taxonomy in Section 2.2 
and the initial values ,0 ,( , 0)iv t  x  for the state variables of the generation, storage, transmission 
and distribution components are also defined.   
 
5.4 Definition of the capacities and demands at the component and network level 
 
Once the resolution of the model is defined, we need to estimate the nodal capacities ( )c t  and 
demands ( )d t , as discussed in Section 2.6 and 2.7.  The capacity at each node ,iv  depends on 
the physical characteristics of the infrastructure components of the network as well as the 
network topology, all of which are defined by the state variables ,( , )iv t x  introduced in Section 
2.5.  The water demand at each residential node is linked to the population living in the 
corresponding tributary area.  Information on the population living in the community is included 
as a state variable for the distribution nodes DV  to obtain the initial amount of goods and services 
requested by the infrastructure (nodal demands).  Models of social systems are used to determine 
the number of people living in each tributary area.  Census data provide information about the 
number of people in residential areas at the zone level (which is typically a higher level than the 
tributary areas).  I assign people to each tributary area using a random allocation (Rosenheim et 
al., 2018).  
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Figure 5.3.  Conceptual representation of the nodal demand estimates based on total number of 
people in the tributary area. 
 
Based on the total number of people I calculate the water demand for each tributary area Figure 
5.3).  In terms of uncertainty propagation, uncertainties are introduced in the population 
allocation to each tributary area (Rosenheim et al., 2018).  It is possible to estimate the 
commercial and industrial water demand using a similar approach based on the commercial and 
industrial activities in each tributary area. 
 
5.5 Assessment of the changes in network capacity and demand following the hazard event 
 
In the aftermath of a hazard event, there may be a direct impact on the infrastructure’s 
component.  Fragility curves [ ( ); ]F t S Θ  and repair rate curves [ ( , ); ]t s  S x  discussed in 
Section 2.6 can be used to assess the damage state of the nodal and linear components, 
respectively.  However, as discussed in Chapter 4, physical infrastructure often depend on each 
other and such (inter)dependencies might indirectly affect a network capacity.  As a result, even 
if a network has no direct physical damage, there could be a loss or reduction of connectivity or 
functionality of such network because of the physical damage (and corresponding loss of 
connectivity or functionality) of a supporting network.  
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Figure 5.4.  Conceptual representation of the assessment of the changes in network capacity and 
demand following the hazard event. 
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Chapter 3 presented topology and flow-based approaches to translate the physical damage into 
loss or reduction in connectivity and functionality and Chapter 4 introduced the MHN model to 
propagate such loss or reduction across all dependent networks.  Not only the capacity, also the 
demand can be affected by dependencies.  For example, building damage can lead to people 
dislocation or business interruption that affects the post-event water demand.  To capture the 
post-event nodal demands (i.e., the requested amount of goods and services) the proposed procedure 
includes the human response to a damaging event (captured by models of social systems) along 
with the associated uncertainties.  Examples of possible responses include the decision to leave the 
community (i.e., evacuation or external dislocation) or to relocate within the community (i.e., 
relocation or internal dislocation).  Network connectivity measures or network specific models of 
the physical flow  ( , )me t  may be used to assess the ability of the damaged network to ensure 
connectivity or provide essential goods and services, based on the updated network capacity ( )C t  
and demand ( )D t  (Figure 5.4).   
 
5.6 Assessment of the infrastructure recovery 
 
To model the recovery process of each element in a network, a stochastic formulation that 
accounts for the actual work progress has been presented in Sharma et al. (2017) and discussed 
in Section 2.8.  The formulation models the change in time during the recovery process of the 
state variables ( , )iv tx  that define the network elements.  By modeling the state variables ( , )iv tx  
during the recovery, we can estimate the network capacity over time accounting for the relevant 
uncertainties.  According to the formulation, the work in the recovery may progress over time 
but the reliability and functionality of the system changes only when a group of activities is 
completed.  Recovery curves developed in this way are intended to replace the arbitrary recovery 
curves that have typically been adopted in the past.  As the individual components recover, the 
infrastructure functionality and connectivity also recovers; topology and flow-based approaches 
(Chapter 3) can be used to evaluate the functionality of the infrastructure at different time steps, 
as the network components are repaired, taking into account the multiple dependencies and 
interdependencies (Chapter 4).  The recovery time of a dependent component is a function of its 
recovery time and that of the supporting element.   
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Figure 5.5.  Conceptual representation of the assessment of the infrastructure recovery.  
 
For each time step of the recovery process, the proposed methodology updates the state of the 
components in the network based on the initial damage state and corresponding restoration 
functions.  The recovery process is shaped not only by the dependencies and interdependencies 
among physical infrastructure, but also between physical infrastructure and social systems.  The 
human response depends on the goods and services provided by the systems of physical 
infrastructure.  At the same time, the goods and services provided by each physical infrastructure 
depends on the human response. This is because the human response affects the demand on each 
physical infrastructure and therefore the ability of the infrastructure to meet such demand.  For 
example, population dislocation depends on the ability of the physical infrastructure to provide 
housing, potable water and other goods and services.  At the same time, population dislocation 
affects the demand on the infrastructure, which a damaged physical infrastructure might or might 
not be able to meet.  Not meeting a demand for an extended period might induce an additional 
population dislocation that is in addition to an initial population dislocation due to the impact on the 
infrastructure intended to provide goods and services that are immediate necessities like housing.  
This iterative process, sketched in Figure 5.5, demonstrates the complex interdependency between 
physical infrastructure and social systems.   
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The presented methodology differentiates internal and external population dislocation to determine 
the change in population size and distribution, with a direct impact on the state variable ,( , )D D iv tx  
of the distribution nodes of the infrastructure.  In the first case, dislocation results in a reduction 
of the population size of a community.  Internal dislocation results in an increase of the population 
size at the assembly points keeping a constant overall population of a community.  In general, 
models of reliability and resilience of physical infrastructure that neglect the integration with human 
response models may provide biased results, with estimates of higher nodal demands, slower 





CHAPTER 6: APPLICATIONS TO TESTBEDS 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, I apply the models presented in this dissertation to a number of example testbeds, 
including isolated and interdependent, virtual and real critical infrastructure considering topology 
and flow-based approaches. 
 
Topology-based approaches are applied to the following cases: 
i) An isolated virtual transportation network, to highlight the importance of second order 
measures of connectivity, nodal weights and auxiliary nodes in the reliability of critical 
infrastructure; 
ii) Two interdependent virtual physical networks, considering physical and geographical 
dependency and two categories for the nodes (generation and distribution), using the MHN 
model to capture the role of interdependencies in the reliability of interdependent critical 
infrastructure; 
iii) A real transportation network taking into account the human response in the aftermath of 
a hazardous event, to highlight the importance of the integration of physical infrastructure 
and social system in the reliability and resilience of critical infrastructure. 
 
Flow-based approaches are applied to the following cases: 
i) An isolated virtual water network, to highlight the importance of hydraulic analysis and 
network functionality measures in the reliability of critical infrastructure; 
ii) Two dependent physical systems of a virtual community, namely the potable water and the 
electric power systems,  considering physical dependency and different categories of nodes 
to capture the role of interdependencies in the reliability and resilience of interdependent 
critical infrastructure; 
iii) A real potable water network, modeled with different levels of resolution, taking into 
account the human response in the aftermath of a hazardous event, to highlight the 
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importance of the integration of physical infrastructure and social system in the reliability 
and resilience of critical infrastructure. 
 
6.2 Topology-based approaches 
 
In the following three examples, I apply topology-based approaches discussed in Chapter 3 in the 
modeling of the reliability and resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure, based on the 
models presented in Chapters 2 and 5.  Applications of the topology-based analysis to physical 
networks subject to natural events can be found, for example, in Kang et al. (2008), Guikema and 
Gardoni (2009), and Kurtz et al. (2015).  The topology-based analysis captures the reliability and 
resilience of infrastructure through the measures of network connectivity.  The measures of 
network connectivity and their variation over time have been discussed in Chapter 3 and they may 
be applied to assess community resilience goals (Boakye et al., 2018). 
 
6.2.1 Independent physical infrastructure 
 
In the following example, I apply the topology-based approach to an isolated virtual transportation 
network subject to a seismic event.  More details about the presented application can be found in 
Guidotti et al. (2017a). 
 
6.2.1.1 Problem definition 
 
Let us consider the transportation network in Figure 6.1 that connects 8 cities by highways with 
12 bridges.  This network is selected as a benchmark case already studied by Kang et al. (2008).  
To explore the implications of considering nodal weights and auxiliary nodes, I evaluate two 
different scenarios.  In the first scenario, 1( , )LS A W , all the cities have the same size and there are 
no auxiliary nodes (top plot).  The second scenario 2 ( , , )L NS  A W W  has cities of different size and 
auxiliary nodes between City 1 and City 7 (bottom plot).  In both scenarios, empty circles represent 
cities, where the size of each circles represents the size (e.g., population) of the corresponding city, 
squares represent bridges, grey circles represent auxiliary nodes (the sub-network with the 
auxiliary nodes is also shown in the zoom-in window in Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1.  Example transportation network, the top plot shows Scenario 1 (all the nodes with 
same weights and no auxiliary nodes) and the bottom plot shows Scenario 2 (with different nodal 
weights and auxiliary nodes). 
 
For the two scenarios, it is possible to calculate the connectivity measures in the pre-event scenario 
both for the global network and for a given node i , using Eqs. (3.19) to (3.30).  These values 
constitute a baseline to quantify the impact of a disturbance (e.g., an earthquake) on the network.  
When dealing with nodal values, I compute them for City 1, assuming the presence of a hospital 
located within City 1.  In the example, 1S  is the benchmark case, to assess, in comparison with 





I consider as intensity measure, ( )tS , of the disturbance at each link of the network the peak ground 
acceleration ( )PGA  induced by an earthquake of magnitude M  at a distance R  from the link.  
Attenuation relationships have been developed to estimate PGA  as a function of M  and R  based 
on fault type and the soil characteristics.  Whereas any complex and sophisticated attenuation 
relationship could be used, for the purposes of this example, I consider a simple attenuation 
 
 70  
relationship that has the form recommended by Kanai (1961) and by Esteva and Rosenblueth 




0.5 20.067 30MPGA e R

    ,  (6.1) 
 
where R  is expressed in km  and PGA  in g .  With reference to the axes in Figure 6.1, I assume 
that the epicenter of the earthquake is a point source located at (0,0)  and I consider values of the 
magnitude from 6 to 9.  Whereas a number of fragility curves for bridges are available in the 
literature (e.g., Gardoni et al., 2002, 2003; Huang et al., 2010), for this example I consider for all 
the bridges, the following hypothetical fragility curve: 
 
 
0                       0 0.1g,
Failure of bridge , 0.1    0.1g 1.1g,
1                              1.1g.
PGA








Eq. (6.2) provides the probability of failure for a bridge connecting nodes i  and j , given the value 
of PGA .  In order to make the comparisons consistent, the conditional probability of failure of the 
sub-network with auxiliary nodes connecting Cities 1 and 7 in 2S  is the same as the conditional 
probability of failure of Link 6 in 1S .  The failure of the bridges is considered to be conditionally 
independent.  Namely, all bridges are subject to the same seismic event but the failure events of 
each bridge pair for given intensity measures at the bridge sites are assumed to be independent.  
This is a common assumption in bridge network reliability (e.g., Kang et al., 2008; Lee et al., 
2011).  The procedure is designed with modularity so that current models of seismic attenuation 
and fragility curves can be independently updated.  
 
The status of a network after the occurrence of an earthquake depends on bridge failures.  For 
values of M  varying from 6 to 9, I simulate the state of the network in the post event case, for 
both the scenarios, m  times, as part of a Monte Carlo simulation scheme.  At iteration k , I sample 
iju  from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 for each bridge ( , )i j  and generate the post-event 
adjacency table kA  according to the following scheme:  
 
 




0     if   Failure of bridge , ,
~ 0,1 ,     a
1                                                      otherwise.
ij
ij k ij
u P i j PGA
u U




No changes affect LW  and NW .  In this way, I generate m  tables A , and estimate the nodal and 
network reliability using the fragility functions described in Section 4.  Instead of fixing a definite 
number of samples m , I tune the number of Monte Carlo simulations on a desired value of the 




Figure 6.2 shows an example of the importance of the nodal measures of connectivity, with 
references to the two scenarios 1S  and 2S .  On the Y-axis are represented the values of 1  , 1 , 
1   and 1   obtained deterministically by the removal, in turn, of each one of the six bridges that 
connect City 1 with the rest of the network, being the other five bridges operational.  On the X-
axis, I report the number of the removed bridge, according to the nomenclature of Figure 6.1.  
Different markers identify the two scenarios.  Using the proposed nodal weights changes which is 
the most important bridge in the network.  We see that in the first scenario the removal of Bridges 
2 and 6 determines the highest value for 1   and the lowest value for 1 .  The removal of Bridge 
5 implies the highest value for 1   and the lowest value for 1 , when the nodal weights and 
auxiliary nodes are introduced.  This allows us to identify the most important bridge of the network 
among the six bridges that connect City 1 with the rest of the network.  Similarly, 1   and 1   
shows the highest variation for Bridge 5 in scenario 2S .  
 
Figure 6.3 shows the relation between    and   for the two considered scenarios.  Each point on 
the graph corresponds to a different network in the post-event scenario, considering only the 
connected network that have a finite value of   .  I plot on the X-axis the values of   and on the 
Y-axis the values of   .  We see that there is not a one-to-one relation between the two measures 
even if a trend is observable: an increase of    corresponds to a decrease in  , as expected.  We 
observe also that the second scenario is associated with a larger number of combinations of    
and  , due to the presence of the auxiliary nodes. 
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Figure 6.2.  Values of the four nodal connectivity metrics, deterministically obtained by the 
removal, in turn, of each one of the six bridges that connect City 1 with the rest of the network for 




Figure 6.3.  Relationship between the variation of    and   for the considered scenarios. 
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Figure 6.4.  PMF of the measures of connectivity for the considered scenarios. 
 
The measures of connectivity after the occurrence of a disturbance are random variables.  Figure 
6.4 shows how the distributions of those measures change with the magnitude of the disturbance 
and how the distributions change from 1S  to 2S .  For different values of magnitude, the top row 
of Figure 6.4 shows the probability mass function (PMF) of    (from 1 to , considering only 
the cases when a diameter is defined) and  (from 0 to 1, considering all the cases), for 1S  (left 
hand column) and 2S  (right hand column).  The bottom row of Figure 6.4 shows the PMF of    
and   .  The arrows point the initial values of the measures of connectivity.  We observe that: i) 
the expected value and standard deviation of the distributions of    and    increase with the 
intensity of the disturbance, for both 1S  and 2S ; ii) the expected value of   decreases with M  
and its variability increases, for both 1S  and 2S ; iii) the mean value of 1   increases in 1S  and 
decreases in 2S , while its standard deviation increases with M  for both the scenarios.   
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The results can be explained considering that the expected value of    increases with M  because 
it is more likely that a higher intensity disturbance corresponds to a higher number of link failures, 
and hence a higher value of diameter.  For the same reason, the expected value of   decreases at 
high values of M , capturing the loss in efficiency of the network.  For the PMF of second order 
connectivity measures, I point out that the distribution of 1   presents values smaller than the initial 
one, and in the case of 2S , this results in a decrease of its expected value.  This can be explained 
considering that the efficiency takes into account also the cases in which one or more nodes are 
not connected with the rest of the network.  This results in cases with a few connected links, having 
low values of ijh , hence of  , with a lower variability than in the pre-event scenario.  Nodal 
weights and auxiliary nodes in 2S  affect mainly the initial values of    and  , the shape of the 
distributions and the range of variability in    and 1  .  This is due to the choice of the nodal 
weights, and a different combination of weights could result in a different trend.  
 
Figure 6.5 provides the three-dimensional (3D) scheme of the system network fragility described 
in Eq. (3.37) and presents the obtained results.  The 3D plots show the probability of exceedance 
given in Eq. (3.37) versus Tr   and M  given Tr   and the same probability of exceedance versus Tr   
and Tr   given M .  The bottom row plots show the results of the analysis for the two scenarios and 
for different values of M  ( 7M   and 8M  ) and Tr   (corresponding to an increase of 20% and 
50% of the initial value, respectively 0.63Tr    and 0.79Tr    for 1S  and 2.64Tr    and 
3.30Tr    for 2S ).  We observe that i) the probability of exceedance, under similar conditions, is 
different for the two considered scenarios, pointing out the importance of considering nodal 
weights and auxiliary nodes; ii) higher values of M are associated with a higher probability of 
exceedance; iii) higher values of Tr   correspond to a lower probability of exceedance. 
 
Similarly, Figure 6.6 provides the actual 3D plot of the system network fragility described in Eq. 
(3.38).  The top row figures show the probability of exceedance given in Eq. (3.38) versus Tr  and 
M  given Tr   and the same probability of exceedance versus Tr  and Tr   given M .   
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Figure 6.5.  Top row: System network fragilities for the scenario 
1S for given values of Tr   and 
M ; Bottom row: The probability of exceedance is plotted vs. Tr   for the two scenarios and for 
different values of M  and Tr  . 
 
The bottom row plots show the results of the analysis for the two scenarios and for different values of 
M  ( 7M   and 8M  ) and Tr   (corresponding to an increase of 20% and 50% of the initial value 
for 1S , respectively 0.59Tr    and 0.65Tr   , while for 2S  I consider the initial value and the 
maximum value, corresponding to an increase of about 5%, 1.13Tr    and 1.18Tr   ).  Also in this 
case, we observe that i) the probability of exceedance is different for the two considered scenarios; ii) 
higher values of M are associated with a higher probability of exceedance; iii) higher values of Tr   
correspond to a lower probability of exceedance.  In the case of 2S  we observe that the Tr   slightly 
affect the curve of the probability of exceedance.  As a result, with the given choice of nodal weights, 
Tr   does not constitute a constraint in the determination of the probability of exceedance as defined in 
Eq. (3.38); nevertheless, a different combination of nodal weights may lead to different results and 
considerations. 
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Figure 6.6.  Top row: System network fragilities for the scenario 
1S for given values of Tr   and 
M ; Bottom row: The probability of exceedance is plotted vs. Tr  for the two scenarios and for 
different values of M  and Tr  . 
 
Finally, Figure 6.7 provides the 3D visualization of the four-component system network fragility 
described in Eq. (3.39).  The top row scheme shows the probability of exceedance given in Eq. 
(3.39) versus Tr  and Tr  , given M , Tr   and Tr  .  The bottom row plots show the results of the 
analysis for the two scenarios and for different values of M  ( 7M   and 8M  ) and Tr  
(corresponding to a decrease of the 20% and 50% of the initial value, respectively 0.74Tr   and 
0.46Tr  , for both 1S  and 2S ).  In both cases, I fixed the thresholds for    and   , respectively 
0.79Tr    and 0.65Tr    for 1S  and 3.30Tr    and 1.18Tr    for 2S ).  We observe that i) the 
probability of exceedance is different for the two considered scenarios; ii) higher values of M are 
associated with a higher probability of exceedance; iii) higher values of Tr  correspond to a higher 
probability of exceedance. 
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Figure 6.7.  Top row: system network fragilities for the scenario 
1S for given values of M , Tr   
and Tr  .  Bottom rows: The probability of exceedance is plotted vs. Tr   for the two scenarios and 
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6.2.2 Interdependent physical infrastructure 
 
In this section, I apply the topology-based methods discussed in Chapter 3 and the MHN model 
discussed in Chapter 5 to two interdependent virtual physical infrastructure.  More details about 
the presented application can be found in Guidotti et al. (2017b). 
 
6.2.2.1 Problem definition 
 
Let us consider two interdependent physical infrastructure having respectively 50 and 100 components.  
Examples of interdependent critical infrastructure may be a water system depending on the power 
system because it needs power at the pumping stations and control systems, or a power system needing 
the water system for cooling, or a transportation system needing power for signaling and a power 
system needing the transportation system to access the locations of critical components.  The 
components of each network are of two categories, with 15% of the components belonging to 
generation category and the remaining 85% belonging to distribution category.  Two different classes 
of interdependency are considered: physical, between generation components of the two networks, and 
geographical, based on the location of the components.  The model includes 13 physical and 76 
geographical dependencies.  Two components have dependencies of both classes (physical and 
geographical).  Figure 6.8 provides a 3D illustration of the networks. 
 
 
Figure 6.8.  3D illustration of the networks with representation of their interdependencies on a plane. 
 
 79  
6.2.2.2 Methodology 
 
In order to apply the MHN model discussed in Chapter 5, I build the probability dependency table 
P .  Figure 6.9 illustrated table , where the dots in the table represent non-zero entries.  It is 
possible to observe that the entries along the main diagonal of the table are all set to zero, reflecting 
independency of nodal failure within the two networks.  I consider the same likelihood table L  
for the two classes of dependency with the following values for the components of the two 




0 0.95 0 0.25
0.95 0 0.25 0
0 0.90 0 0.75
0.90 0 0.75 0
 
  
   








In this example, the values in table L  are assumed constant.  However, as discussed in Chapter 
5, the entries of table L  are functions and their value may depend on the categories of both 
components, on the respective network of belonging, and on the class of dependency.  I simulate 
the network damage by a random removal of its components.  Removing a component of the 
network impact its connectivity and likely its functionality.  To quantify the impact of the removal 
on the network I use the first order connectivity metrics introduced in Chapter 3.  
 
Figure 6.9.  Non-zero entries of the table P . 
P
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6.2.2.3 Results 
 
Figure 6.10 shows the variation of the two metrics, diameter ( )k  and efficiency 
( )k , as a function 
of the number of removed components, comparing the case of the two interdependent networks 
with the case of independent networks.  The continuous lines refer to the mean value while the 
dotted lines to the one-standard deviation confidence bands.  The statistics of ( )k  and efficiency 
( )k  are obtained by Monte Carlo simulations with a convergence criterion based on the coefficient 
of variation ( COV ) of the connectivity metrics; I used a threshold value of 0.02COV   in the 
calculation.   
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The confidence band reflects the uncertainty in the order of removal of the components and in the 
probability of failure of dependent components, as from table P .  Removing a component from a 
system impact its connectivity and likely its functionality.  Direct removal of nodes triggers the 
removal of depending nodes, according to the probabilities from table P .  The removal of the 
depending nodes may, in turn, trigger the removal of nodes that are supported by them, according 
to the probabilities from table P , and so on, until equilibrium is reached, in a iterative process that 
captures the cascading effect among and within critical infrastructure.  In this example, I halt the 
cascading effect to the first iteration, focusing on the effects of the additional failures induced by 
the initial direct removal of nodes only.  The interdependency results in smaller values of efficiency 
and higher values of diameter, for the same number of removed components. 
 
The failure of a given component can generate two or more disconnected clusters, resulting in an 
infinite value for the diameter and a failure of the network.  Figure 6.11 shows the probability mass 
function of the number of removed components that leads to    .  In the case of interdependent 
networks, the average value change considerably, from 4.747 to 3.458 for Network 1, and from 
7.661 to 5.472 for Network 2. 
 
 
Figure 6.11.  PMF of the number of removed components to have a disconnected network. 
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6.2.3 Interdependent physical infrastructure and social systems 
 
This section focuses on topology-based approaches to assess the reliability and resilience of a real 
transportation network subject to seismic hazard, taking into account the human response, namely 
the population dislocation.   
 
6.2.3.1 Problem definition 
 
In this section, I consider the transportation infrastructure of Seaside, Oregon subject to a seismic 
hazard.  Seaside is a coastal community with 6,440 inhabitants and a seasonal population that adds 
an additional 7,000 persons over the summer months, based on the 2010 decennial census data 
(Rosenheim et al., 2017, 2018).  Seaside is in a seismic zone, as it is located near the Cascadia 
Subduction Zone.  The city has been selected as a testbed by the Center for Risk-Based Community 
Resilience Planning funded by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), with 
the purpose of testing procedures and methodologies developed within the Center.  In this 
illustration, Seaside is subjected to a hypothetical earthquake of magnitude MW 7.0, located 25 km 
southwest of Seaside (offshore the Oregon coast, on the Cascadia subduction zone).  I use a ground 
motion prediction model (Boore and Atkinson, 2008) to estimate the seismic intensity (in terms of 
peak ground values and spectral accelerations at the characteristic period of the structures).   
 
Figure 6.12 shows the model of the transportation infrastructure, developed for this example based 
on the data obtained by the Clatsop County.  The model consists of 377 origin nodes, 11 bridges, 
and 7 assembly points (e.g., shelters, schools or gyms and large open areas).  The assembly points 
constitute the destination nodes in the present analysis and their location has been retrieved from 
available evacuation maps (http://www.oregongeology.org/).  Assembly points located in close 
proximity has been merged, without compromising the validity of the analysis. 
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Figure 6.12.  Transportation infrastructure of Seaside, Oregon. 
 
Damage to bridges affects the capacity of the transportation system to provide goods and services 
(namely varying the connectivity between origin/destination nodes).  However, dependency 
between the physical infrastructure and social system will affect also the demand imposed to the 
transportation system.  The occurrence of the seismic event, damaging the building inventory, will 
affect the human response, inducing population dislocation.  Appendix B discusses the integration 
of detailed household characteristic data with the building inventory of Seaside that leads to the 
estimate of people dislocation due to building damage in the aftermath of the seismic event.  As a 
result, the number of people and their spatial distribution changes in the aftermath of a seismic 
event.  Figure 6.13 shows the transportation system considering as nodal weights the people 
afferent to each origin node of the transportation system.  
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Figure 6.13.  Population at the nodes of the transportation network before (left hand side) and after 




In this example, I consider the bridges as the only vulnerable components of the transportation 
infrastructure.  The damage state and the corresponding recovery duration for the 11 bridges of 
Seaside is estimated using physics-based fragility and recovery functions, as discussed in Nocera 
et al. (2018).  Table 6.1 summarizes the structural characteristics of the 11 bridges. 
 
Table 6.1.  Structural characteristics of the bridges of the transportation infrastructure of Seaside 





















     [m] [cm] [m]   [°] 
1 1957 CC G CCP 105 60.96 3.353 3 8 0 
2 1952 C G CCP 110 60.96 3.353 7 4 0 
3 1963 PC S O 146 60.96 3.353 6 5 0 
4 1924 CC AD N/A 163 / / 3 / 0 
5 2001 PC S O 141 60.96 3.353 3 8 0 
6 2003 PC Co O 176 60.96 3.353 4 12 0 
7 1975 PC S O 110 60.96 3.353 3 8 0 
8 2001 PC S O 141 60.96 3.353 3 8 0 
9 2002 PC S O 141 60.96 3.353 3 7 0 
10 1957 S Cu N/A / / / 3 / 30 
11 2005 PC S CPP 98 60.96 3.353 1 6 0 
Material: PC = Prestressed Concrete; CC = Continuous concrete; C = Concrete; S = Steel. 
Design Type: G = Girder; S = Slab; AD = Arch Deck; Co = Concrete; Cu = Culvert. 
Deck Structure: CCP = Concrete Cast-in Place; CPP = Concrete Precast Panels; O= Other; N/A = Not Available.  
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Figure 6.14.  The probability of being open/closed for the bridges in the transportation 
infrastructure in the immediate aftermath of the seismic event. 
 
Table 6.2.  List of activities for recovery for a generic RC bridge in a complete damage state (after 
Nocera et al., 2018). 
Number Activity Duration (Days) Predecessor(s) 
  Lower Bound Most Likely Upper Bound  
1 Inspection 2 3 5 / 
2 Bidding 15 20 30 1 
3 Mobilization 5 7 15 2 
4 Structure excavation 0.5 1 1 3 
5 Erection of temporary support (Column) 1 2 3 3 
6 Erection of temporary support (Abutment) 1 2 3 3 
7 Remove existing column 0.5 1 2 5 and 6 
8 Place reinforcement (Column) 1 2 3 7 
9 Place column forms 0.5 1 2 8 
10 Pour concrete (Column) 0.5 1 2 9 
11 Curing (Column) 7 10 15 10 
12 Demo existing shear key (Abutment) 1 1 3 6 
13 Install reinforcement (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 12 
14 Install forms (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 13 
15 Pour concrete (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 14 
16 Curing concrete (Abutment) 7 10 15 15 
17 Strip forms (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 16 
18 Install replacement bearings (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 17 
19 Remove of temporary support (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 18 
20 Repair cracks with epoxy (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 19 
21 Repair spalls (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 19 
22 Install joint seal assembly (Abutment) 0.5 1 2 20 and 21 
23 Remove forms (Column) 0.5 1 2 11 
24 Removal of temporary support (Column) 0.5 1 2 23 
25 Structure backfill 1 2 4 24 
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Figure 6.14 shows the probabilities that each of the considered bridges is closed in the immediate 
aftermath of the seismic event.  I consider a bridge to be closed when its damage state is either 
moderate, or heavy, or complete.  Different damage states are defined according to Simon et al. 
(2010).  To find the time for a bridge to re-open, physics-based recovery functions for each of the 
moderate, heavy, and complete damage states can be used, following the procedure in Sharma et 
al. (2017).  As presented in Nocera et al. (2018), Table 6.2 shows individual recovery activities for 
the repair of a bridge in the complete damage state.  The durations of activities are according to 
Mackie et al. (2007); however, the values are adjusted based on the specific geometry of each 
bridge.  In addition to the most likely durations of each activity, the table reports the lower and 
upper bounds of the durations that represent the variability in their estimates.  The table also shows 
the set of predecessors of each activity (recovery activities needed before a specific activity can 
start).  I assess the performance of the transportation infrastructure, considering the variation of 
the connectivity measures in the immediate aftermath of the seismic event and during the recovery.  
I consider the four local connectivity measures introduced in Chapter 3,  i , i , i , and  i , where 
i  is the set of the 7 assembly points (destination nodes).  I use as the benchmark, the values of the 




Figure 6.15 shows the estimate of time-varying connectivity measures, standardized to the 
corresponding pre-disturbance value, during the recovery in the two scenarios, considering or 
neglecting the people dislocation.  To capture the uncertainties in the damage states and the 
recovery durations of bridges, I perform a Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) with a convergence 
criterion based on the coefficient of variation ( COV ) of the connectivity measures with a 
threshold value of 0.02COV  .  As for the recovery sequence of bridges, for each run of the MCS, 
I choose to recover sequentially the bridges in the order that maximizes the increase of efficiency 
 .  Though   is not defined for disconnected networks,   is always defined and it ensures the 
fastest recovery of network connectivity.  Figure 6.15 shows that for both the scenarios in the 
immediate aftermath of the seismic event, there is 14.5% reduction in the value of   and 17.3% 
increase in  ; after about 18 months, the network almost restores the pre-disturbance state in terms 
of the connectivity measures.   
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Figure 6.15.  The recovery curve of the transportation infrastructure in terms of topology-based 
connectivity measures considering the two scenarios with and without people dislocation. 
 
The biggest difference between the two scenarios can be inferred by Figure 6.16.  While 
standardized value of the first order measures of connectivity do not vary significantly between 
the two scenarios, the standardized value of eccentricity i  in the immediate aftermath of the 
seismic event is higher in the dislocation scenario.  This suggest that in the population dislocation 
scenario, the shortest paths to reach the assembly points may have values different from that 
suggested by the diameter  i  and higher than in the scenario that neglect the population 
dislocation.  High values of eccentricity indicates that there are portions of the network more 
damaged than others and the population dislocation is not homogeneous in the community, with 
certain population groups more impacted than others or that recover more slowly.  Limiting the 
reliability and resilience analysis to the first order of connectivity will lead to underestimate the 
actual societal impact (Murphy et al., 2001; Gardoni and Murphy, 2018). 
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Figure 6.16.  Ratios over the recovery time between topology-based connectivity measures 
calculated under the two scenarios with and without people dislocation. 
 
Independently on the number of people, if a bridge failure separates an assembly point from the 
rest of the network, we have a disconnected network.  Figure 6.17 shows the probability that the 
network is connected in the aftermath of the seismic event as a function of time.  The figure shows 
that the full network connectivity is restored after about 6 months.  The figure also shows the 






































  (6.6) 
 
where ( )Q P   i ;   is the center of resilience that captures the recovery pace; RT  is the 
recovery duration; and   is the resilience bandwidth that captures the recovery spread. 
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6.3 Flow-based approaches 
 
In the following three examples, I apply flow-based approaches discussed in Chapter 4 in the 
modeling of the reliability and resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure, based on the 
models presented in Chapters 2 and 5.  Network-specific models of the physical flow are 
considered to evaluate the impact of hazardous events on the specific damaged network, in terms 
of the ability to provide essential goods and services.   
 
6.3.1 Independent physical infrastructure 
 
The following example applies flow-based approaches to a water system subject to a seismic event.  
More details on the presented application can be found in Chmielewski et al. (2016) and Guidotti et 
al. (2016b). 
 
6.3.1.1 Problem definition 
 
Let us consider the water system shown in Figure 6.18, composed of nine junctions and twelve 
pipelines with the characteristics listed in Table 6.3.  A reservoir and treatment plant at node 9 provides 
water to the network, through a pumping station.  A tank above node 12 completes the model.  A 
hydraulic simulation is performed using EPANET (Rossman, 2000).  The nodal values of pressure, 
water flow and quality will serve as a baseline for comparison to evaluate the functionality of the 




The damage model assessment uses the ground motion prediction equations in Fernandez and Rix 
(2006).  Different attenuation equations or physics-based models of seismic propagation may be 
adopted.  In the current analysis, those equations provide the intensity measure of interests, given 
meaningful earthquake and site characteristics, such as magnitude, distance from the epicenter, soil 
conditions, faulting system, etc.  Considering an earthquake of magnitude 7.5 located 10 km from the 
water network, Figure 6.19 show the maps of three intensity measures of interest, respectively, the 
peak ground displacement (PGD), peak ground velocity (PGV) and peak ground acceleration (PGA).  
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Once the intensity measures of the considered hazard are known at each location, the damage to the 
elements of the system is evaluated.  For nodal elements, such as pumping stations, tanks and treatment 
plants, the damage model uses fragility functions depending on PGA, while for pipelines, repair rate 
curves based on PGD and PGV are used.   
 
Figure 6.18.  Water system map, as coded in EPANET software. 
 








10 10530 (3210) 18 (45.7) 145 
11 5280 (1600) 14 (35.6) 135 
12 5280 (1600) 10 (25.4) 135 
21 5280 (1600) 10 (25.4) 135 
22 5280 (1600) 12 (30.5) 135 
31 5280 (1600) 6 (15.2) 135 
110 200 (60.0) 18 (45.7) 125 
111 5280 (1600) 10 (25.4) 120 
112 5280 (1600) 12 (30.5) 120 
113 5280 (1600) 8 (20.3) 120 
121 5280 (1600) 8 (20.3) 120 







10 710 (216) 0.00 
11 710 (216) 150 (9.46) 
12 700 (213) 150 (9.46) 
13 695 (212) 100 (6.31) 
21 700 (213) 150 (9.46) 
22 695 (212) 200 (12.6) 
23 690 (210) 150 (9.46) 
31 700 (213) 100 (6.31) 




Figure 6.19.  Intensity measures (PGD, PGV and PGA, from left to right) obtained through ground 
motion prediction equations (Fernandez and Rix, 2006). 






















































 92  
Water system specific damage and recovery models presented in Section 3.2.3 are used to characterize 
the status of the water system’s components in the immediate aftermath of the seismic event and 
throughout the recovery process.  After the damage analysis is completed for the immediate post-event 
damage, and for each subsequent recovery time-step, the output from the damage and recovery models 
is conveyed to the functionality models described in Section 3.2.3.  A hydraulic analysis of the 
damaged water system is performed with the software EPANET-EMITTER (Pathirana, 2010).  A 
Python script reads the component identifier, damage level, and location (for pipe damage), and 
modifies the EPANET-EMITTER input file to reflect the damage.  At each step, the input file is 
updated with remaining system damage, and operational values are retrieved from the previous time-
step report file (i.e., tank levels, nodal quality measurements).  The process is iterated over a number 
of recovery time steps, until a user-defined desired level of functionality is met. (In this example, I use 




In this example, I consider three indicators of water system functionality: the quantity of demand 
met, the ability to maintain system pressures, and the provision of safe, potable water quality.  For 
each demand node in the system, these three functionality metrics are calculated for each recovery 
time-step, and compared to the baseline measurements at that node.  Plots for each metric versus 
hour of recovery timeframe are provided for a representative demand node (node 11) in Figure 
6.20.  Because of changes in operating conditions during damaged operations and the recovery 
process, sometimes the recovered operations do not align with the unperturbed baseline cycle.  In 
these cases, a range of baseline measurements may indicate whether operations can be considered 
normal.  An alternate indication of recovery level is the return of the measurements to an 
acceptable operational threshold (e.g., a minimum pressure threshold of 15.0 psi or 103 kpa).  
Meeting acceptable operational thresholds is a less stringent measure of recovery than returning to 
baseline patterns.  Moreover, the baseline demand may be considerably different in the post-event 
scenario, because of the human response and the decision to dislocate or relocate.  As shown in 
Figure 6.21, these functionality metrics can be used to quantify system resilience.  The functional 
recovery of the entire water system can be quantified with the percent of total system demand met.  
For recovery of pressure and quality, the sum of total nodal pressures and qualities conveys 
arguably less information than total system demand.   
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Figure 6.20.  Variation of functionality metrics at Junction 11 (Water demand, pressure and quality 
from left to right). 
 
 
Figure 6.21.  Recovery progress for demand, pressure and quality of the entire system. 
 
For these indicators, it may be more useful to track the percentage of demand nodes that have 
satisfied the individual recovery metrics described above (return to the desired percent of baseline 
ranges or meeting an acceptable operational threshold).  For pressure and quality recovery, the 
results are given in terms of the percentage of demand nodes that meet recovery thresholds.  For 
water quality, the nodes without potential contaminant intrusion from cross-connections (whose 
quality measurements have returned to undetectable levels) are counted.  For pressure, two 
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different recovery indices may be used: return to at least 90 % of minimum baseline pressure for 
that node, or satisfaction of pressure levels above 15.0 psi (103 kpa).  An alternate measure of 
demand recovery could be the percentage of demand nodes whose requested demand is being 
satisfied at each time-step.  For demand recovery, the simpler indicator described is used 
(percentage of total system demand satisfied for each time-step). 
 
Plots in Figure 6.20 and Figure 6.21 refer to a single realization of the described procedure, a 
Monte Carlo Simulation strategy can be adopted to capture the uncertainty in the damage status of 
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6.3.2 Dependent physical infrastructure 
 
In this section, I apply the flow-based methods presented in Section 4 to the Centerville testbed, 
considering the dependency of the water systems on the electric power system.  More details about 
the presented application can be found in Guidotti et al. (2016a). 
 
6.3.2.1 Problem definition 
 
Several works in recent years focused on the physical dependency between potable water network 
and electric power network, because of its importance in the recovery of a community and because 
it is among the most intuitive to understand and model (e.g., Grigg, 2002, 2003; Kim et al., 2007, 
Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008; Franchin and Cavalieri, 2015).  As presented in Kim et al. (2007), 
the probability of the loss of functionality of a node in the water system due to a power outage is 
conditional to the simultaneous failure of each one of the supporting nodes of the electric power 
system.  In this illustration, failure of a component in the water system occurs either as the direct 
failure of the component due to the earthquake or as the cascading loss of functionality due to the 
failure of supporting component.  In that sense, this conditional probability represents the strength 
of the dependency between the two networks.  In this example, following the methodology described 
in Section 2, table ( , ) ( , ) ( , )WN EPN WN EPN WN EPN P A L  provides the dependency of the water network on 
the electric power network.  According to the proposed methodology then, a conditional probability 
of failure equal to 0 means that the components of the water system are decoupled from the electric 
power system.  Water system components with backup power units, that can supply the needed 
electric power in case of failure of the electric power system, are an example of such decoupled 
situation.  Conversely, a conditional probability of failure of 1 means that a water system component 
fails if the supporting electric power system’s component(s) fails, (e.g., when backup units are not 
available). 
 
In this application, I study the reliability and resilience of the water network of the virtual 
community of Centerville including its dependency on the electric power system when subject 
to a seismic event.  The Centerville virtual community is developed as a testbed for the NIST-
funded Center of Excellence for Community Resilience (http://resilience.colostate.edu) with the 
purpose of testing procedures and methodologies (Ellingwood, 2016a). 
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Figure 6.22.  Centerville’s electrical power network superimposed to the potable water network, 
with highlighted dependency areas (adapted from Guidotti et al., 2016a).  
 
Centerville is representative of a typical mid-size city, with approximately 50,000 inhabitants.  I 
consider the physical dependency of the water network of Centerville on the power network.  The 
water network consists in: 14 distribution nodes 
( )WN
DV , including small diameter distribution lines 
receiving water from trunk lines and distributing it to customers of the tributary area served by 
each node; 29 transmission nodes 
( )WN
TV , corresponding to the large diameter pipelines; two 
generation nodes 
( )WN
GV , consisting in a reservoir that provides water to the system and a backup 
source of water (northeastern well); and two storage nodes 
( )WN
SV ,consisting in two tanks.  This 
system depends on the electric power network, which consists in: 24 distribution nodes 
( )EPN
DV , 
constituted by towers/poles, 29 transmission nodes 
( )EPN
GV , consisting in 5 transmission lines, 4 
distribution lines and 20 sub-distribution lines; and 8 generation nodes 
( )EPN
GV , consisting in a 
power plant, a transmission substation, a main grid substation, two distribution substations and 




For each node of each network I define the vector of state variables ( , )iv tx , used in the category-
specific capacity and demand models.  For example, in the case of the transmission nodes of the water 
network, the state variables include geometric characteristics of the pipe, material, year of installation.   
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Figure 6.23.  Intensity measures (PGD, PGV and PGA, from left to right) obtained through 
ground motion prediction equations (Fernandez and Rix, 2006). 
 
In the example, I consider the response of the two networks under a seismic event, namely a MW 
6.5 earthquake located 25 km southwest of Centerville.  The Fernandez and Rix (2006) ground 
motion prediction equations are used to obtain the vector of the intensity measures of interest ( )tS  
for the different categories of nodes (Figure 6.23).  The direct physical damage to the water 
system’s component and their recovery is assessed using models described in Section 3.2.3.  It is 
important to underscore that in the representation of the water system of Centerville, only the large 
diameter trunk lines are represented, with the demand nodes taking into account the smaller 
distribution lines included in their respective tributary areas.  
 
Using the MHN model defined in Chapter 5, the topologies of the water and power networks 
provide us the adjacency tables along the main diagonal of the augmented adjacency table: ( )WNA  
and ( )EPNA , respectively.  I identify the areas of Centerville that need energy supply (square boxes 
in Figure 6.22); those areas include the nodes of the water network with a physical dependency on 
supporting nodes of the electric power network (namely the pumping stations of the water system).  
This information is used to obtain the out-of-diagonal tables of the augmented adjacency table, 
( , )WN EPN
A  and ( , )EPN WNA , and the dependency tables ( , )WN EPND  and ( , )EPN WND .  The augmented 












  (6.7) 
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I am considering the physical dependency of the water network on the power network only, 
therefore ( , )EPN WND  is a null matrix and the dependency table D  is not symmetric.  I model two 
extreme cases: the first one with independent (isolated) networks, the second one with perfect 
dependency, with the entries of the likelihood table L  and of the probability dependency table P  
corresponding to the dependent nodes of the water network equal to 1.  In the first case of 
independent systems, the water system is decoupled from the electric power system and pumping 
station components are removed from the model only when their direct damage level exceed a 
given threshold (in this case they do not rely on the electric power system to function).  In the 
second case of perfect dependency of the water system on the electric power system, a power 
outage at any of the three supporting nodes of the electric power system fails the corresponding 
water network pumping station.  In this case, pumping station components are removed from the 
network model when either their direct damage level exceeds a given threshold or the supporting 
electric power system components fail.   
 
The network damage state is input to the functionality assessment models described in Section 
4.4.3.  I first perform a baseline hydraulic simulation of the water system without damage.  A 
daily average demand of water is associated to each one of the demand nodes of Centerville.  
Figure 6.24 shows three patterns for water demand relative to the baseline demands: residential 
(R), commercial (C) and industrial (I).  The figure shows for each hour of a day the value of the 
multiplier of the daily average demand of water.  The percentage of nodes that meet pressure, 
demand, and water quality requirements relative to the baseline solution is used to evaluate the 
post-event functionality of the water system.  However, the nodal water baseline demand may 
change following a disruptive event, for example due to leaks, changes in day-to-day behavior, 
and evacuations or relocations, affecting the percentage of nodes that meet the demand and 
pressure thresholds. 
 
At each time step of the recovery process, the network damage and functionality is updated from 
the previous time step using recovery models described in Section 4.4.2.  In the illustration, for the 
case of dependent systems, the recovery of non-functional pumping stations depends both on their own 
recovery time and on the recovery time of the supporting electric power system’s nodes. 
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Figure 6.24.  Daily water demand patterns for residential, commercial and industrial use. 
 
The process of damage, recovery and functionality assessment is repeated until the water system 
has achieved 100% of baseline performance for 24 consecutive hours, which is the recovery time 
for that iteration.  I consider the mean value of recovery time for the analyses when comparing 
the isolated and dependent water system.  I use a Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) to capture the 
uncertainties in the problem.  The described methodology constitutes a single run of the MCS.  
The uncertainties accounted for in this illustration are in the assessment of the physical damage 
of the network components, in the dependencies, and the recovery time for network 
functionality.  Uncertainties not modeled include those in the initial network characteristics, in 
the hazard scenario (since only one case is considered and each run of the MCS has the same 




The flow-based network analysis described in this application has been performed with the 
software IN-CORE (Gardoni et al., 2018).  The software calculates the flow of potable water   in 
the damaged network, in the two extreme cases.  I used a Monte Carlo simulation to capture the 
uncertainties in the problem, with a termination criterion based on the COV  of the considered 
functionality metrics; I used a threshold value of 0.15COV   in the calculation.   
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To assess the resilience of the Centerville’s water system and the role of its dependency on the 
electric power system, Figure 6.25 shows two functionality metrics for recovery.  The first metric 
indicates the percentage of demand nodes for which the demand met is greater than or equal to 
the demand required at the corresponding time of day relative to the baseline demand of 100%.  
Immediately after the hazard event (at time 0), water system flow also includes leakage.  For 
each node n  of the water system with a baseline demand greater than zero, the threshold to 
measure flow delivered inFD   is 
 
1,    















nq  is the flow delivered to node  during time step i , and 
i
nQ  is the baseline demand for 
node  during time step i .  The second metric in Figure 6.26 indicates the percentage of nodes 
meeting a pressure threshold of at least 138 kPa (20 psi).  This threshold is sometimes used as a 
measure of fire protection capacity (e.g., Davis et al., 2012).  After a hazard event, the additional 
water flow required for fire-fighting would likely reduce available flows and surrounding pressures 
below 138 kPa (20 psi).  The curves in Figure 6.25 represent the value of the sample mean X  and 
the sample standard deviation S  of the considered functionality metrics as a function of recovery 
time.  (Note that I do not assume any probability density function for the functionality metrics).  
In Figure 6.25 “WN” indicates an independent water system, whereas “WN+EPN” indicates a 
water system depending on the electric power system. 
 
Figure 6.26 shows the recovery progress of the water system in meeting the pressure requirements 
in a different way.  Hourly demand satisfied in a damaged system may fluctuate substantially, as 
shown in Figure 6.25.  Though cyclic demand patterns over 24 hours do affect the percentage of 
baseline demand satisfied, the fluctuations can be misleading, conveying a more optimistic picture 
of system functionality during off-peak times, when pressure is easier to maintain.  To better 
visualize the progress of system recovery, Figure 6.26 shows at each hour and day of the recovery 
process the percentage of nodes attaining or exceeding the required pressure threshold.  Figure 
6.26 shows that during the peak hours of the daily water demand a lower percentage of nodes is 
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Figure 6.25.  Percentage of nodes able to satisfy a given demand (top) or pressure (bottom) at 
each recovery time step.  
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Table 6.4.  Recovery time (in days) for functionality metrics in independent and dependent water 
systems (sample mean, X , and standard deviation, S , and 95 % confidence interval, CI ). 
Metric 
Independent water system Dependent water system 
 [ ]X d  
 [ ]S d  CI   [ ]X d  
 [ ]S d  CI  
Flow Delivered 2.59 1.49 (2.50, 2.68) 5.94 3.95 (5.70, 6.18) 
Pressure 2.78 1.48 (2.69, 2.87) 6.00 3.85 (5.77, 6.24) 
Quality Met 4.87 1.90 (4.75, 4.98) 8.28 3.78 (8.05, 8.51) 
Boil Water Notice 6.13 2.09 (6.01, 6.26) 9.57 3.86 (9.33, 9.80) 
 
Because of the nature of the dependencies, the dependent water system performance generally 
serves as a lower bound for the performance of the independent water system.  This relationship 
is manifest in several features of the plots in Figures 6.25 and 6.26.  Most notably, the 
dependency on the electric power system results in longer recovery times.  Average 
functionality, plotted in Figures 6.25 and 6.26, is taken here to be the mean of each functionality 
metric over all trials at each time step.  Table 6.4 provides sample mean and standard deviation, 
and a 95 % confidence interval for the mean of the recovery time of each functionality metric.  
Recovery time is taken here to be the amount of time after the event at which each metric first 
returns to 100 % of its baseline value for 24 consecutive hours.  The recovery time to meet the 
nodal baseline demand and pressure metrics increased from 2 to 3 days for the independent water 
system with a functional electric power system, to a recovery time of 6 days for the dependent 
water system.   
 
Three additional plot characteristics may be taken into account for explaining longer recovery 
times and generally lower functionality during recovery efforts in the dependent water system 
than in the independent water system.  First, the minimum values of demand and pressure 
functionality metrics are lower for the dependent system than for the independent one.  In both 
systems, the lowest point appears to occur around 12 to 18 hours.  The lower minimum 
performance of the dependent system could be attributable to the steeper decline in service 
during the first 12 to 18 hours, which would support the theoretical findings of Buldyrev et al. 
(2010) that interdependent systems fail more abruptly than isolated ones.  Second, the shape of 
the recovery curves of the functionality metrics also imply more rapid recovery of the 
independent system, compared to the dependent one (for demand and pressure, this is seen more 
easily in Figure 6.26).  This is consistent with the fact that two systems need to recover from the 
event, instead of only one system.   
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Figure 6.27.  Percentage of local demand nodes without potential contamination (top) and 
without issuance of a boil water notice (bottom) at each recovery time step. 
 
The shape of the recovery curves for the dependent system experiences a more gradual return to 
full functionality (longer time constant).  Third, due to the presence and the possible failure of a 
larger number of components, the coupled dependent system has higher standard deviations than 
the independent system in each of the functionality metrics.  It is outside the scope of this 
dissertation to set an acceptable threshold for the sample standard deviation, as this may depend 
on several factors, including economical and societal ones.  However, I note that a greater 
standard deviation reflects a higher level of uncertainty in the functionality assessment and 
recovery times for the dependent system than for the independent system. 
 
In addition to the functionality metrics of Figure 6.25, for the assessment of the water system 
resilience, it is of great importance to monitor the water quality.  The curves in Figure 6.27 
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represent the value of the sample mean X  and the sample standard deviation S  of the 
functionality metric used to monitor water quality, as a function of recovery time for the 
independent and the dependent systems.  The ‘boil water’ metric imitates the process of issuing 
and lifting boil water notices at local demand nodes.  Due to low pressures and pipe ruptures, 
potential sources of cross-contamination may necessitate the local or global issuance of a boil 
water notice within the independent water system.  If the potential sources of contamination can 
be isolated, the boil water notice is issued only for the local areas affected.  When the potential for 
contamination is widespread, a boil water notice is issued for the entire system.  In Figure 6.27, a 
system-wide boil notice issuance is set to occur if 50% or more nodes are affected by 
contamination.  Different criteria may be used for other systems (such as a water system with 
multiple pressure zones), as well as in a water system where more detailed operational changes, 
such as valve closures, are modeled.  After flushing each contaminated node, there is a delay of 24 
hours to allow for updated results of bacteriological testing before the boil water notice is lifted.  
A water quality transport modeling is udes to determine the percentage of nodes free of potential 
cross-contamination, reported as ‘quality met’ in Table 6.4.  Table 6.4 shows that the boil water 
issuance is a more stringent indicator of when water can be safely consumed by the community.  
The recovery time to meet the nodal baseline quality met and boil notice metrics increases from 
nominally 4 to 6 days for the isolated water system, to a recovery time of 8 to 10 days for the 
dependent system.  Similar conclusions can be drawn for the water quality metric in Figure 6.27 
as for the nodal demand and pressure metrics in Figures 6.25 and 6.26; dependency of the water 
system on the electric power system results in fewer demand nodes being satisfied and a longer 
recovery time.  
  
 
 105  
6.3.3 Interdependent physical infrastructure and social systems 
 
In this section, I apply the flow-based methods presented in Section 4 to the Seaside, Oregon 
testbed, considering the interdependency between physical infrastructure and social system, 
namely the water system and the human response, with the decision to dislocate or relocate.  More 
details about the presented application can be found in Guidotti et al. (2018a). 
 
6.3.3.1 Problem definition 
 
In this section, I focus on the reliability and resilience of the city of Seaside, Oregon (Section 6.2.3 
and Appendix B) to seismic hazard, modeling with flow based approaches the interdependency 
between physical infrastructure and social systems, namely its potable water system and the human 
response.  The model of the water system of Seaside is based on the available data secured from 
the city engineers.  The data include information on the pipe system (length, diameter, material, 
year of installation), on the main reservoir, located in the south fork of the Necanicum River, few 
kilometers southeast of Seaside, and on the main pumping stations and tanks in the water system.  
To model the complete water system, I added a portion of the network designed based on current 
practice from new development areas for which no data were available.  The water system in those 
areas is modeled following current practice and design criteria (Ysusi, 2000).  The resulting piping 
system consists of about 60 miles (about 100 km) of pipes of various material (mainly cast iron) 
with diameter varying from 2” to 24” (about 5 to 60 cm), one main reservoir, two tanks and nine 
pumping stations.  The water system data define the state variables of the generation , 0( , )G G iv tx , 
storage , 0( , )S S iv tx  and transmission , 0( , )T T iv tx  components of the water system at 0t t .  To 
assess the state variable ,( , )D D iv tx  of the distribution nodes, namely the nodal demands, I used the 
following set of information: i) the water average daily use, of about 1.8 MGD 
(http://www.cityofseaside.us); ii) the population inventory, consisting of 6,440 inhabitants, 
obtained from the 2010 decennial census data (Appendix B, Rosenheim et al., 2018); iii) the 
available zoning of Seaside, distinguishing the areas of the city based on the land use, i.e. 
residential, commercial and industrial zone (http://maps.co.clatsop.or.us); iv) estimated daily use 
of water per capita and per acre, based on land use (Ysusi, 2000); and for internal dislocation only 
v) the location of assembly points from available evacuation maps 
(http://www.oregongeology.org/).  
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Figure 6.28.  Skeletonized (Left hand side) and Detailed (Right hand side) models of the potable 
water system of Seaside, Oregon. 
 
Based on this information, two different models of the water system of Seaside have been 
developed, considering different levels of resolution, as discussed in Section 2.4 (Figure 6.28).  
The figure shows also the location of the assembly points considered.  In the skeletonized water 
system of Seaside only large diameter (larger than 6”) lines are explicitly modeled as transmission 
nodes, while small diameter distribution lines are captured in the equivalent demand nodes.  
Consequently, the state variables of the transmission nodes include the characteristic of the main 
components of the infrastructure only.  The grouping criterion followed in the generation of the 
skeletonized model is based on the available zoning of Seaside; therefore, each zone corresponds 
to a tributary area.  An equivalent distribution node is placed at the centroid of each tributary area.  
For the residential zones, the state variable corresponding to the requested amount of water ( Dw ) 
is estimated based on the population in the tributary area, with the following formula: 
 
D u zw w N    (6.9) 
 
where uw  is the expected water usage per person and zN  is the total number of persons living in 
the tributary area, based on the population inventory (Rosenheim et al., 2018).  For the city of 
Seaside a value of 111uw   gal/per capita/per day has been estimated (Ysusi, 2000).  For 
commercial and industrial zones, Dw  is estimated based on the extension of the considered 
tributary area, with the following formula: 
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D v zw w A    (6.10) 
 
where vw  is the expected water duty per aerial extension based on land use and zA  is the total area 
of the considered tributary area.  Values of 2040vw   gal/day/acre and 1620vw   gal/day/acre 
have been estimated for commercial and industrial zones, respectively, based on the available table 
of typical water duties (Ysusi, 2000) and on the average daily use of water for the city of Seaside. 
 
In the detailed water system of Seaside the infrastructure components are modeled at the highest 
level of detail.  The state variables of the nodes include the characteristic of all the water system 
components.  For residential areas, the requested amount of water at the distribution nodes depends 
on the population living at the water system’s distribution nodes, which are the buildings of 
Seaside.  The water demand can be estimated with the following formula: 
 
D u iw w n    (6.11) 
 
where in  is the total number of persons living in the building served by the water system’s 
distribution node.  The process of assigning a number of people to each building of Seaside is 
described in (Rosenheim et al., 2018).  Similarly to the skeletonized model, the estimate of Dw  
for commercial and industrial zones has been obtained from Eq. (6.10).  
 
A water flow analysis under ideal conditions shows that both the skeletonized and the detailed 
water systems have adequate operating pressure throughout the system, taking into account the 




After defining the water system model, I need to assess the initial damage state for the considered 
infrastructure.  In this example, the City of Seaside is subject to a seismic event.  Consistently with 
the examples in Section 6.2.3 and Appendix B, I considered an earthquake of magnitude 7.0WM   
located 25 km southwest of Seaside, offshore the Oregon coast, on the Cascadia subduction zone 
happening at 12:00 AM (midnight).  Ground motion attenuation equations (Boore and Atkinson, 
2008) are used to describe the seismic intensity ( )tS  in terms of peak ground acceleration (PGA).  
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The time of occurrence of the earthquake is used in the water demand models since water demand 
varies with time during a day. 
 
A building damage analysis with the corresponding value loss estimation is presented in Appendix 
B and used to assess the people dislocation.  As for the impact of the seismic hazard on the water 
system, the expected number of repairs is a function of the state variables  , ,T T iv tx  of the 
transmission node, namely the pipes, which include their length, material, diameter and year of 
installation.  Once the direct damage has been assessed, I need to include the cascading effects due 
to the interdependency among systems of physical infrastructure and social systems.  In this 
example, I focus on the integration of physical and social systems.  The modeling of the 
(inter)dependency among physical infrastructure (e.g., water and electrical power system) has been 
presented in Section 6.3.2 and more details can be found in Guidotti et al. (2016a).  As discussed 
in Appendix B, under the considered seismic scenario, the population dislocation is estimated with 
a logistic regression model (Lin 2009, Rosenheim et al., 2018), based on the residential structural 
damage and the corresponding value loss.  The procedure distinguishes two extreme cases of 
population dislocation: i) population leaving the city (external dislocation); ii) population 
relocating to the closest assembly point (internal dislocation).  Population dislocation (external or 
internal) affects the post-event water system demands, modifying the state variables of the 
distribution nodes for both the skeletonized and the detailed model.  The updated nodal demands 
in the skeletonized model are based on the population left in each tributary area.  In the detailed 
model, the nodal demands are assessed at each end-node and they are set to zero if the nodes are 
inhabited.  The change in population resulting from the human response model induces a change 
in the state variables of the distribution node  , ,D D iv tx , in the nodal demand 
, ,[ ( , ), ( ); ]D D D i d Dd v t tx Z Θ , and, consequently, in the flow analysis for the damaged water system. 
 
Based on the updated capacity and demand models, it is possible to assess the reduction or loss of 
functionality of the considered infrastructure over time.  In the example of Seaside, a pressure-
driven flow-based analysis is conducted with the software IN-CORE (Gardoni et al., 2018), 
developed within the Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning to assess the 
reduction or loss of functionality of the water system.  As discussed in Section 4.4.3, for the 
hydraulic analysis the software includes the EPANET (Rossman, 2000) and EPANET-EMITTER 
(Pathirana, 2010) engines adopting a pressure-driven approach when the water system is damaged.  
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6.3.3.3 Results 
 
The flow model presented in Chapter 4 links the reduction or loss of functionality with the 
impossibility of the infrastructure to provide to the distribution nodes the requested flow of goods 
and services.  In this case, damage to the components of the water system affects the infrastructure 
functionality.  The water system may not be able to satisfy a given demand and a minimum 
pressure at the distribution nodes.  In particular, if the pressure at a distribution node is below a 
certain threshold cross-contamination phenomena may occur.  In the example of the water system 
of Seaside I consider the operating pressure at the nodes q  , function of the water flow   in the 
water system as the quantity of interest to monitor to assess the reduction or loss of functionality 
of the infrastructure in the aftermath of a damaging event and during the recovery process. 
 
Figure 6.29 shows the functionality for the skeletonized water system of Seaside in the immediate 
aftermath of the damaging event (i.e., at time 
0
t  ).  The results refer to a Monte Carlo Simulation 
(MCS) in which at each run the damage state of the infrastructure components is determined.  The 
flow analysis in the damaged infrastructure makes it possible to determine the value of the 
operating pressure q  at each distribution node and at each run of the MCS.  A termination criterion 
based on the coefficient of variation ( 0.1COV  ) of the percentage of nodes meeting a minimum 
operating pressure is adopted in the analysis.  The color of the nodes indicates the most likely 
among three functionality states, representative of the functionality of the node: i) operating 
pressure q  equal or below 0; ii) q  between 0 and 15 psi (103.4 kPa); iii) q  greater than 15 psi 
(103.4 kPa, acceptable condition).  The bar plot in Figure 6.29 represents the likelihood of being 
in each one of these three states for each one of the nodes of the skeletonized model.  The plots in 
Figure 6.29 reflect the reduction or loss of functionality of the infrastructure.  The water system 
experiences a large disruption, with more than 90% of the nodes with not acceptable operating pressure 
( 15psi.)q    Nodes able to maintain an operating pressure above 15 psi are concentrated in the new 
development areas, in the eastern side of the city.  The skeletonized model is able to capture the spatial 
variability of the reduction or loss of functionality loss of the water system by identifying the areas of 
the city with a larger impact.  However, the skeletonized model provides an average response for each 
equivalent node.   
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Figure 6.29.  Assessment of functionality of the skeletonized water system at time 
0
t  . 
 
To capture the variability of the response at a finer granularity a pressure-driven flow-based analysis 
is performed on the detailed water system model.  Figure 6.30 shows the results of this analysis at time 
0
t  considering the distribution nodes of the detailed model corresponding to three reference nodes of 
the skeletonized one, characterized by different functionality states.  The three zoom-in windows show 
the variability of the impact in terms of reduction or loss of functionality within the skeletonized 
distribution node.  The state of the distribution nodes within the considered subnetwork has a variability 
that is not captured by the skeletonized model.   
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Figure 6.30.  Spatial variability of the impact captured by the high granularity of the detailed mode 
at time 
0
t  . 
 
To assess the accuracy of the proposed skeletonized model, as described in Section 2.4, Table 6.5 and 
Figure 6.31 show the results of an ANOVA study, based on the observed values of the operating 
pressure q  at time 
0
t  .  Figure 6.31 shows a box plot for the operating pressure values observed in the 
detailed model, for each of the residential distribution nodes of the skeletonized model.  For each of 
these nodes the central mark indicates the median value of the operating pressure q , the top and bottom 
edges of the boxes indicate the 75th and 25th percentile, respectively; the margins extend to the most 
extreme data not considered outliers, while the “+” symbol represents the outliers.  The median value 
of a node is significantly different from the median value of another node (at 5% significance level) if 
their intervals, represented as notches, do not overlap.  The majority of the skeletonized nodes show a 
modest variability in the box (from 25th to 75th percentile) smaller than 10 psi (68.9 kPa), suggesting 
that the skeletonized model is able to capture the spatial variability in the tributary areas of these nodes.  
Seven nodes (Nodes 8, 12, 15, 30, 31, 37 and 38) show a larger variability in the box.  The skeletonized 
model may be not able to capture the spatial variability within the tributary areas corresponding to 
these nodes.   
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Figure 6.31.  Box plot for the operating pressure values observed in the detailed water system as a 
result of the performed ANOVA. 
 
Table 6.5.  ANOVA table. 
 SS  dof  MS  F    1,K N KP F F    
BSV  52192.1 29 1799.73 27.9 7.37104e-121 
WSV  105216.3 1631 64.51   
Total 157408.4 1660    
  
These nodes include one or more pumping stations, that, when not damaged, determine a steep change 
in the operating pressure q  upstream and downstream the station, suggesting the need for an additional 
partitioning of the skeletonized nodes in these cases.  From the values in Table 6.5, based on the 
definition provided in Section 2.4, we observe that BMS  is significantly larger than WMS , suggesting 
that the variability of q  between subnetworks (or nodes of the skeletonized water system) is larger 
than the variability within each subnetwork (or node of the skeletonized water system).   
 
After the initial impact, capacity and demand continue to change over time.  The infrastructure 
components are repaired over time (as modeled using recovery curves); as a result, the 
infrastructure progressively recovers its functionality.  Following the approach presented in 
(FEMA, 2003), the equivalent number of days needed to finish the repairs to the pipeline can be 
calculated with the following relation: 
 
































    
 
  (6.12) 
 
where EqN  is the number of equivalent days needed to finish the repairs as a function of the number 
of leaks and breaks in small pipes with diameter smaller than 20”, about 50 cm ( SL  and SB , 
respectively) and leaks and breaks in large pipes with diameter greater than 20” ( LL  and LB , 
respectively), and fw  is the available workforce, considering 16-hour day shift, as suggested in 
(FEMA, 2003).  To illustrate the role of fw  Figure 6.32 shows the infrastructure recovery considering 
3 different scenarios, of 4-, 8- and 12-person crews, respectively (from left to right) and no initial 
dislocation.  The plots in Figure 6.32 show for each scenario the quantity Q  defined as the percentage 
of nodes in the water system attaining or exceeding the minimum acceptable value for the operating 
pressure q  at each hours and day of the recovery process.  The water system recovery analysis updates 
the state of the physical components at 12-hour intervals, therefore major changes in Q  can be 
observed every 12 hours.  In the 4-person crew scenario the value of Q  is equal to 60% after one 
equivalent week of repair work, while 100%Q   is reached after 6 and 4 equivalent days of repair in 
the 8- and 12-person crew scenario, respectively.  The figure illustrates also the multiplier applied to 
the residential water demand to take into account the hourly variability of the water demand at the 
distribution nodes during the day.  Figure 6.32 shows temporarily decreases of the values of Q  
corresponding to higher values of water demand multiplier in the afternoon hours. 
 
Figure 6.32.  Variation of  [%]Q  representing the percentage of nodes attaining or exceeding the 
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Next, I focus on the integration of the human response in the functionality recovery process.  The 
recovery scenarios presented in Figure 6.32 are based on the recovery of the physical components 
of the considered infrastructure only.  However, in the aftermath of the damaging event, the 
population served by each demand node may change as described by the human response models.  
Figure 6.33 shows the recovery over time of the skeletonized water system considering the 
variation in the water demands induced by the population dislocation due to the buildings damage 
(shown in Figure B.1).  The analysis assumes an external dislocation, i.e. dislocated population 
leaving the city.  Figure 6.33 shows the recovery of functionality at different equivalent hours of 
repair ( t =24, 48, 72 and 96) assuming an 8-worker crew.  The meaning of colors and bars is the 
same as in Figures 6.29.  With respect to the information in Figure 6.32, Figure 6.33 shows the 
spatial variability of the recovery of functionality for the water system at each considered time 
step.  For each node Figure 6.33 shows the most likely state on a map (plots on the left) and the 
likelihood of being in that state (bar plots on the right).  The water system has an acceptable 
condition for q  as the most likely state for the entire set of nodes after 96 equivalent hours of 
repairs.  
 
The scenario illustrated in Figure 6.33 is based on the assumption of an initial external dislocation.  
However, population may relocate to the closest assembly point (internal dislocation).  In addition, 
the lack of essential goods and services (i.e., not acceptable value of q ) for an extended time may 
induce further population (external or internal) dislocation.  Figure 6.34 and Table 6.6 compare 
four possible dislocation scenarios at 72t   hours against the baseline scenario (Scenario 0) that 
neglect the population dislocation resulting from the human response model.  The four dislocation 
scenarios considered are: i) Scenario 1: initial external dislocation due to buildings damage; ii) 
Scenario 2: additional external dislocation at 72t   hours due to not acceptable value of q  at 
residence following the initial external dislocation; iii) Scenario 3: initial internal dislocation to 
the closest assembly point due to buildings damage, and iv) Scenario 4: additional external 
dislocation at 72t   hours due to not acceptable value of q  following the initial internal 
dislocation.  An 8-worker crew is assumed in the recovery analysis for each dislocation scenario. 
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Figure 6.33.  Recovery of the skeletonized water system (t = 24, 48, 72 and 96 hours from top to 
bottom) considering an external dislocation due to building damage. 
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Figure 6.34.  Comparison of the reduction or loss of functionality at t=72 h of the recovery process 
considering no dislocation(left hand side) and four different dislocation scenarios (right hand side). 
 
Table 6.6.  Comparison of dislocation scenarios. 
 Scenario  
 0 1 2 3 4 
External Dislocation due to 







Internal Dislocation due to 
building damage (at t0+) 





External Dislocation due to 


















Nodes attaining or exceeding 











Percentage values refer to a population of 6,440 people and 46 nodes. 
 
Figure 6.34 shows that, in general, to consider the (internal or external) population dislocation in 
the recovery process results in a larger number of nodes attaining or exceeding the acceptable 
condition for q  than in Scenario 0 (13 nodes, 28.26%).  Scenario 1 results in a larger number of 
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Scenario 3 (17 nodes, 36.96%), since the overall water demand on the network is significantly 
reduced.  Scenario 2 does not have a significant impact on the number of nodes attaining or 
exceeding the acceptable condition for q , while Scenario 4 has the highest number of nodes 
meeting the acceptable condition at 72 equivalent hours (30 nodes, 65.61%).  This result is 
reasonable considering that Scenario 4 considers a high number of dislocated population at 72 
hours.  The number of nodes not satisfying the condition on q  is higher in Scenario 3 than in 
Scenario 1 and the number of nodes attaining or exceeding the acceptable condition for q  in 
Scenario 4 is higher than in Scenario 2.   
 
The results presented in Figure 6.34 in terms of the most likely nodal state is not necessarily an 
indication of a better condition: a higher number of nodes attaining or exceeding the acceptable 
condition for q  does not necessarily corresponds to a higher number of population served.  
Considering a population of 6,440 people in Seaside, Scenario 0 has at t=72 hours a population 
served of 2,095 (32.95%) people, Scenario 1 and 2 count 1,348 (20.93%) people served, while 
Scenario 3 and 4 1,511 (23.46%) people served (see Table 6.6).  Scenarios 1 and 2 consider an 
initial external dislocation of 5,393 people (55.79%) and an additional dislocation of 1,499 
(23.28%) at 72 hours (Scenario 2).  Scenarios 3 and 4 consider an initial internal dislocation of 
5,393 people (55.79%) and an external dislocation of 4,929 (76.54%) at 72 hours (Scenario 4).  
The numbers of the additional external dislocation in Scenarios 2 and 4 are given by the number 
of people living in the tributary areas served by equivalent nodes that are not able to attain or 
exceed the acceptable condition for q .  If the tributary area is served by an assembly point, then it 
includes also the population dislocated at time 
0
t   due to building damage (Scenario 4). 
 
Figure 6.35 captures the evolution over time of the recovery of functionality for the four dislocation 
scenarios considered.  Figure 6.35 shows at each hour and day of the recovery process the quantity 
0i iS S S
Q Q Q   , 1,..., 4i  , representing the difference between the percentage of nodes attaining 
or exceeding the minimum acceptable value for the operating pressure q  in the considered 
dislocation scenario ( ,  1,..., 4
iS
Q i  ) and in the scenario with no dislocation (
0S
Q ), presented in 
Figure 6.32 (Scenario 2 with an 8-worker crew).  The highest values of 
iS
Q , equal to 9%, are 
registered in the afternoon of the fourth equivalent day of recovery in the case of initial external 
dislocation, showing how an initial external dislocation can have a significant impact on the 
recovery process for the water system.  The initial internal dislocation has at the same time (fourth 
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equivalent day of recovery) a lower 
iS
Q  and more significantly has negative values of 
iS
Q  
during the sixth day of recovery, suggesting that a change in the spatial distribution of the nodal 
demands may result in an unbalanced water system resulting in a slower recovery process.  
Between the two scenarios with additional dislocation after the third equivalent day of repair, the 
one having initial internal population dislocation shows higher values of 
iS
Q  during the morning 
of the fourth day of recovery, suggesting an acceleration in the recovery process.  As discussed in 
Figure 6.34, the acceleration in the recovery process is mainly due to the high number of people 
leaving town at the beginning of the fourth day of recovery in Scenario 4.  Overall, the results of 
the comparisons in Figures 6.34 and Figure 6.35 and in Table 6.6 show the importance of modeling 
the integration of physical infrastructure and social systems in communities’ reliability and 
resilience analysis. 
 
Figure 6.35.  Variation of 
iS
Q  representing the difference between the percentage of nodes 
attaining or exceeding the minimum acceptable value for the operating pressure q  in the 
considered dislocation scenario and in the scenario with no dislocation, at each hours and day of 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
This dissertation presented a novel probabilistic methodology to quantify the reliability and 
resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure and applied it to a series of example testbeds, 
including isolated and interdependent, virtual and real critical infrastructure.  Infrastructure have 
been modeled as networks, applying to civil engineering tools of graph theory.  Topology and flow-
based approaches have been used to translate the physical damage of the single components into loss 
or reduction of network functionality and to develop network capacity and demand models.  These 
models have been integrated in a time-varying network reliability and resilience analysis to assess 
the network response in the immediate aftermath of a hazard event and at different times during 
recovery process, as the network components are repaired.  Multiple interdependencies among 
physical infrastructure and between physical infrastructure and social systems have been included in 
the presented probabilistic methodology.  A multi-layered heterogeneous network model have been 
presented to capture the role of interdependencies and propagate the loss or reduction of functionality 
across all dependent networks. 
 
This dissertation applies the topology and flow-based models to a series of example testbeds.  From 
the three examples that used topology-based approaches, I can draw the following observations: 
 
i) The first example of an isolated virtual transportation system subject to seismic excitation 
has been presented to show how the results change varying the population distribution 
among nodes and introducing auxiliary nodes.  It is important to underscore that auxiliary 
nodes and sub-links, while providing a better characterization of the network, imply a 
higher computational cost.  To obtain the most accurate results at a small computational 
cost they could be used only for the most relevant connections. 
 
ii) The second example applied the proposed MHN model to two virtual interdependent 
systems, extending the use of connectivity metrics to the analysis of the reliability and 
resilience of interdependent system under attack.  Results show that to consider 
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interdependencies results in changes of the metrics of connectivity that may lead to the 
failure of the dependent/interdependent network for a lower number of damaged 
components than in independent network. 
 
iii) The third example considered the real transportation of Seaside, Oregon subject to seismic 
excitation, including the models of human response and people dislocation.  The 
application showed the relevance of topology-based approaches in capturing the reliability 
and resilience of the infrastructure through time-dependent measures of connectivity.  The 
application showed also the importance of second order measures of connectivity in 
capturing the variability of people dislocation within the community, with implication in 
terms of social justice. 
 
From the three examples that used flow-based approaches, I can draw the following observations: 
 
i) The first example applied flow-based approaches to assess the reliability and resilience of 
a virtual isolated water system under seismic hazard.  The example shows how to estimate 
key functionality metrics for water systems (in terms of water flow, pressure and quality), 
combining state-of-the-art methods to model both physical damage and functionality of 
water systems.  
 
ii) The second example applied the proposed probabilistic methodology to the potable water 
system of Centerville, depending on the electric power system, subject to a seismic 
hazard.  The case study results demonstrate that the time to recover network functionality 
following a hazard event increases when one network is dependent on another network.  
The additional failures in the dependent water system due to damages in the electric 
power system captured by the MHN model cause a faster decline in water system 
functionality, resulting in a greater overall loss of service.  Although recovery begins 
around the same time in both systems, it concludes significantly later in all recovery 
metrics for the dependent system than for the isolated system.  The recovery time to meet 
the metrics of ‘demand met’ and ‘pressure met’ increases from nominally 2 to 3 days for 
an independent water system, to 6 days for a water network dependent on the electric 
power system.  Similarly, the recovery time of network capacity to satisfy the ‘quality 
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met’ and ‘boil notice’ metrics increases from nominally 4 to 6 days for an independent 
water system to 8 to 10 days for a dependent one.   
 
iii) The third example focused on the integration of physical infrastructure and social systems 
considering the potable water network of Seaside Oregon, under different human response 
scenarios.  The example showed also the role of different model resolutions in capturing 
the spatial variability of the reduction or loss of functionality and its recovery over time.  
Results of this example showed that disregarding the effects of the lack of essential goods 
and services in the human response model (i.e., considering only the effects of the structural 
damage to buildings) might result in an estimate of a lower population dislocation.  On the 
other side, disregarding the information from human response models might result in 
higher estimates of the demands on the physical systems, which in turn can lead to 
estimating a slower recovery process. 
 
The presented examples showed the both topology and flow-base approaches can be conveniently 
used in regional risk and resilience analysis of critical infrastructure.  Topology-based approaches, 
based on the definition of network connectivity typically requires less data than flow-based 
approaches that need system-specific model of flow of goods and services.  Both the approaches are 
able to capture interdependencies among physical infrastructure and between critical infrastructure 
and social systems.   
 
The modularity of the proposed methodology allows developments in multiple directions. 
 
i) The probabilistic methodology relies on model of capacity and demand at the component 
and network level.  Epistemic uncertainty affects the models of capacity and demand, and 
hence fragility and recovery curves, in the form of model errors, statistical uncertainty, and 
measurement errors.  A Bayesian updating approach may be used to treat the uncertainty and 
to drive optimal criteria for both data collection and retrofit prioritization.  The Bayesian 
updating approach may considers the data as they become available at the different levels, 
which are typically of different (heterogeneous) nature (e.g., intensity measures, damage or 
flow data) and at different times. 
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ii) Different levels of dependency strength may be integrated in the proposed MHN model, 
changing the values in the likelihood tables developing case-specific formulations and 
mathematical relationship for the conditional probability of failure of 
dependent/interdependent components in a network, including spatial correlation and 
time dependent effects (e.g., deterioration and aging). 
 
iii) Critical infrastructure has been the focus of this dissertation, but a proper assessment of 
their reliability and resilience starts from an accurate model of the hazard.  With reference 
to the seismic hazard, in recent years, physics-based numerical modeling of seismic wave 
propagation under realistic tectonic and geo-morphological conditions has gained major 
relevance.  Physics-based methods may provide an accurate description of the spatial 
variability of the intensity measures of interest, capturing directivity pulses, 3D basin 
effects, topographic effects, wave scattering and nonlinear soil response, especially in the 
near-source of an earthquake.  These factors could limit the accuracy of ground motion 
prediction equations (GMPE) commonly used in seismic hazard analysis and adopted in 
the presented applications. 
 
iv) The proposed methodology showed the iterative process resulting from the 
interdependency between critical infrastructure and social systems.  Models of human 
response from social scientists may be updated, taking into account the re-occupancy 
after the initial dislocation.  This will result in additional modification of the demand 
imposed on a recovering infrastructure, with implications on the network functionality.  
 
Models, methodology and results of this dissertation shed light into the role of interdependencies 
among infrastructure and between infrastructure and social systems in the recovery of communities.  
By means of the presented models, methodology and results this dissertation aims to benefit civil 
engineers to develop cost-effective mitigations measures and practices in infrastructure design, 
construction and planning, as well as emergency managers, planners and the community to be better 
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APPENDIX A: CONNECTIVITY MEASURES FOR CIRCULAR AND RADIAL 
NETWORK TOPOLOGIES 
A.1 Circular and convex topologies with finite number of nodes 
 
As an example of the information provided by the combination of first and second order 
connectivity measures, I consider the networks shown in Figure A.1.  The top of Figure A.1 shows 
two sets of networks with varying numbers of nodes ( n ) and links.  The top row shows circular 
(or convex) topologies and the second row shows radial topologies.  I consider that there is a unit 
distance between adjacent nodes on the perimeter of each network.  For each network I compute 
( ,  )   and ( ,  )  .  The left plots show the values for the unweighted ( , 1L ijw   for each i  and 
j ) case and the right plots show the values for the link-weighted case where the weight is the 
distance between nodes moving along the links.  When 2n  , 1   for both the circular and the 
radial topologies.  As n  grows and approaches  , the expressions of   for the unweighted case 
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Radial topology: 
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Because the values of   are different in the circular and radial topologies, to compare the 
variability in the /ij optd   between the two cases, I compute the ratio /  .  Considering for 
example 13n   we see that / 0.629    for the circular case and / 0.196    for the radial 
case.  These values indicate that the circular topology has a large variability/imbalance in the 
elements of Δ  and that in the radial schemes almost all of the elements of the matrix Δ  have a 
value close to  .  This aspect cannot be captured by the measure of   only.  Similar considerations 
can be made also for other values of n  for both the unweighted and the link-weighted case. 
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Radial topology: 
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For the unweighted case, I can make similar observations for   and  , as for   and   simply 
keeping in mind that a smaller value of   typically corresponds to a larger value of  .  In the 
link-weighted case, the values of   for the two topologies are also consistent with the values of 
  for small values of n  ( 9n  ).  However, as n  increases the circular topologies become more 
efficient based on  , even though the information based on   would suggest that the radial 
topologies are preferable.  This observation shows that the information content of   and   is 
different and not always consistent.  Therefore, it is important in general to look at both quantities.  
The observations on   and   remain similar to those already made for the unweighted case. 
 
A.2 Limiting case for circular and convex topologies 
 
The fact that as n  increases the circular topologies become more efficient based on   (while the 
diameter for the radial topologies is still lower) for the link-weighted case can be explained 
considering the limiting case where the nodes on the perimeter form a circle ( )n    as shown in 
Figure A.2.  Let i  and j  be two nodes on the perimeter.  I am interested in computing the length 
of the shortest path between the two nodes.  The distance between the two nodes passing through 
the center is always 2R , so a path along the perimeter is shorter when the arc-length is less than 
2R .  I distinguish between the three possible cases shown in Figure A.2 based on the location of 
the starting node i .  The left plot shows the case where all the nodes under an arc of length 4R  (
2R  moving both counter clockwise and clockwise from node i ) have the path along the perimeter 
as the shortest path.  In the other two plots, because of the proximity of node i  to one of the two 
end nodes on the perimeter, only a portion of the nodes from node i  (those under an arc of length 
(2 )R ) have the path along the diameter as the shortest one.  Considering these three possible 
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cases, I can use the total probability rule (Tang and Ang, 2007 to write the following expressions 
of 

  for the circular topology (details are provided in Appendix A): 
 
     1 1 2 2 3 3 2.05ij ij ij ijd d E P E d E P E d E P E R         . (A.5) 
 
In this calculation, I did not include the case when i  or j  is the center node, considering the 
following assumption: in that event there are only n  cases while if both i  and j  are on the 
circumference I have n n  cases.  Therefore, the contribution to the diameter and efficiency can be 
assumed to be an order of magnitude smaller when i  or j  is the center node than in the case both 
i  and j are on the circumference and thus has a negligible contribution to the values of the diameter 
and efficiency as n  tends to infinity.  Based on the same first-order approximation, in case of the 














  .  (A.6) 
 
Similarly, I can obtain the following expression for   for the circular topology: 
 
     1 1 2 2 3 3
0.505
ij ij ij ijh h E P E h E P E h E P E
R
         . (A.7) 
 
Note that 1/ 1/ij ij ijh d d  .  The value of the first-order approximation of   for the radial 

















  .  (A.8) 
 
We observe that for the circular topology both the values of   and  are higher than in the radial 
one.  These results are consistent with the trends shown in Figure A.1 and show that a higher value 
of diameter does not necessarily correspond to a lower value of efficiency. 
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Figure A.2.  Events such that the circular topology is more efficient than the radial one, travelling 




Let us define the following set of events and random variables: 1E  is the event that the distance 
between node i  and the two end nodes is at least 2R ; 2E  and 3E  are the events that the distance 
between node i  and one of the two end nodes is less than 2R  moving clockwise and counter-
clockwise from node i , respectively; 1S  and 2S  are the events that node j  is at a distance from 
node i  such that the length of the arc between the two nodes is shorter than and larger than the 
radial distance between them ( 2R ), respectively; s denotes the distance on the circle between 
nodes i  and j ;   denotes the angle between node i  and the closest end-node in events 2E  and
3E ,   denotes the angle between the end-node and the 4R length arc in event 1E .  Using the total 
probability rule (Tang and Ang, 2007) with reference to Figure A.2: 
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The probabilities of the three events iE are given by 
 
 





















    

  (A.10) 
 
We have the following relations for the probabilities of the event lS  ( 1,  2l  ) given mE  (
1,  2,  3m  ): 
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The values | ,ij l md E S  can be computed as follows: 
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APPENDIX B: INTEGRATION OF DETAILED HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTIC 
DATA WITH CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
B.1 Introduction 
 
A critical step in reliability and resilience analysis of a community is a proper understanding and model 
of the complex interdependency among physical and social systems of infrastructure.  This appendix 
addresses one of the major issues that arise when researchers attempt to complete this critical step, how 
to link aggregated population data with inventories of individual elements related to critical 
infrastructure data that are used to model post-hazard recovery.  Social science surveys related to 
population response to natural hazards and anthropogenic events are typically conducted at the 
household or individual level.  However, standard population data for communities based on a census 
and will be aggregated to protect privacy.  When models are based on the aggregated data the 
heterogeneity in the data is significantly reduced because population characteristics are not uniformly 
or randomly distributed within communities.  Therefore, spatially locating their significant variations 
is critical to model human behaviour/response and in turn hazard impacts and recovery.  Standard 
methods to disaggregate Census data include dasymetric mapping and mircosimulation.  Dasymetric 
mapping uses additional information from satellite imagery and cadastral (tax lot) data to determine a 
gridded population surface to distribute aggregated population counts (Maantay et al., 2007).  
Microsimulation typically uses computational techniques such as iterative proportional fitting to match 
a small sample of microdata, in the United States Public Use Microdata (PUMS) is provided for 
population areas with around 100,000 people, to aggregated data provided for smaller geographic areas 
such a Census Tract which summarizes estimates for around 4,000 people (Wheaton et al., 2009; 
Lovelace and Dumont, 2016).  While both methods disaggregate Census data neither method provides 
a clear way to account for uncertainty or a way to link individual households to critical infrastructure 
such as a residential structure or a node in a potable water network.  To amplify the limitations that 
exist in methods to disaggregate Census data, researchers have recognized the importance of data 
integration for community resilience models that capture differences in household response to natural 
or anthropogenic hazards.  Detailed household characteristics such as tenure status and ability to 
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understand risk related warnings have been correlated with reduced likelihood to take protective action 
(Van Zandt et al., 2012).  Additionally, gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status have been found 
to influence response to natural hazards (Peacock et al., 1997; Mileti and Peek, 2000; Mileti and 
Sorensen, 1990).  This appendix discusses the integration of physical and social systems of 
infrastructure that incorporates the spatial heterogeneity of household characteristics (such as size, race, 
and tenure status) with detailed infrastructure data and applies it to the case of Seaside, as discussed in 
Section 6.2.3 and 6.3.3.   
 
B.2 Overview of Study Area, Datasets and Data Integration Methods 
 
B.2.1 Study Area 
 
The State of Oregon is located in the northwest United States and Seaside, Oregon is located in 
Clatsop County in the on the northern Pacific coast of Oregon.  Seaside, Oregon is a small low-lying 
coastal community with a year-round population of 6,000 persons and a seasonal population that 
adds an additional 7,000 persons over the summer months.  Seaside, Oregon has high hazard 
exposure, as it is located near the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ), which creates significant 
earthquake and tsunami risk (Park and Cox, 2016).  Researchers have estimated that up to 88% of 
the city's buildings could be damaged by a major earthquake and that the economic losses could 
exceed $1 billion (Wiebe and Cox, 2014).  
 
B.2.2 Input Data 
 
The input data include the detailed household characteristic data and the critical infrastructure data, 
namely the building inventory.  The detailed household characteristics data was based on data files 
from the April 1, 2010 Decennial Census.  The April population is during the off-season and 
therefore is more representative of the year-round permanent population.  The data includes housing 
subjects summarized to the block level.  These data formed the basis for a population inventory.  The 
steps for data processing included expanding the Census Block level housing unit data into a file 
where the unit of analysis was a household or group quarters (Rosenheim et al., 2017, 2018).  
Together housing units and group quarters define the two potential living quarters types.  The census 
data provided detailed counts of households, group quarters, and vacant housing units.  
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Table B.1.  Number of Persons by Tenure Status for Seaside, Oregon. 
 Count 
Total Population 6,440 
Owner Population 2,871 
Renter Population 3,569 
 
For the household data, counts were broken down by tenure status (see Table B.1), household size, 
race and ethnicity.  Counts of population within group quarters were broken down by group quarters 
type – such as dorms, prisons, or nursing homes.  Counts of vacant housing were provided by reason 
for vacancy – which include for sale, for rent or seasonal rental.  Based on the census data the final 
population inventory provided a detailed description of the state of the community in terms of social 
characteristics.  The analysis for this dissertation compares owners versus renters.  As for the 
building inventory, the parcel data from Clatsop County was obtained through communication with 
the county.  The parcel data included information about the land use code of the structure based on 
Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR 150-308-215(8)).  A subset of the County Parcel Data 
containing 5,784 parcels was generated for the community of Seaside, Oregon.  The parcel data was 
merged with the 2010 Census Block data, which included the expected number of housing units 
within each block.  The housing unit data was used to estimate the number of housing units per 
parcel.  Commercial properties and parcels without a structure were not assigned housing units.  
 
B.3. Data Integration Methods 
 
B.3.1 Seismic Hazard Modeling 
 
In this example, the city of Seaside is subject to a seismic event.  I considered an earthquake of 
magnitude 7.0 located approximately 25 km southwest of Seaside, offshore the Oregon coast, on the 
Cascadia subduction zone.  Ground motion attenuation equations (Boore and Atkinson, 2008) have 
been used to describe the seismic intensity in terms of peak ground acceleration (PGA).  In the 
interested area, values of PGA range from 0.7 to 0.84 g.  A building damage analysis with the 
corresponding value loss estimation has been performed relying on the considered seismic scenario 
and on available fragility curves from HAZUS-MH (FEMA 2003).  As for the WN, fragility curves 
are used to assess the damage state of the nodal components (i.e., pumping stations and tanks) and 
repair rate curves are used for linear elements (i.e., pipeline). 
 
 155  
B.3.2 Population Dislocation with Stochastic Inventory Matching 
 
Under the given seismic scenario, the population dislocation is estimated with a logistic regression 
model, based on the expected residential structural damage and the corresponding value loss (Lin 
2009).  To account for the uncertainty associated with the model of dislocation Monte Carlo (MC) 
methods were used.  Uncertainty was associated with the stochastic matching between the population 
inventory and the building inventory, the percentage of property value loss due to the hazard 
scenario, and the probability of dislocation due to the value loss.  For each iteration of the MC process 
the building inventory and population inventory were merged based on a merge order determined by 
a random number assigned to each household and each dwelling unit within each Census Block.  To 
account for the uncertainty associated with the damage states a value loss for each potential damage 
state was assigned based on the mean and standard deviation (Bai et al., 2009).  The probability of 
each damage state and the sampled value loss were used as inputs into the model for the probability 
of dislocation (Rosenheim et al., 2017, 2018).  With a predicted probability of dislocation assigned 
to each household, a random number between 0 and 1 was assigned to each household, when this 
number was less than the predicted probability of dislocation the household was assigned a value of 
1 and determined to have dislocated.  Within each MC iteration, households with higher probabilities 
of dislocation were more likely to be assigned to dislocate from the community.  With each iteration, 




Figure B.1 summarized the chain of analysis from hazard modeling to people dislocation, due to 
building damage.  Table B.2 summarizes the result of the dislocation models and compares 
dislocation for owners and renters.  The model for population dislocation predicts dislocation for 
households even if the structure they live in does not have estimated damage.  This is based on 
research from Hurricane Andrew (Peacock et al., 1997) that found that households often dislocate 
after a disaster due to reasons other than property damage.  In the model used for population 
dislocation, a household living in a single-family structure with zero property value loss had however 
a 23-28% probability of dislocation, depending on the demographics of their neighborhood.  
Similarly, a household living in a multifamily structure with no damage had a 33-40% probability 
of dislocation.  
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Figure B.1.  From left to right: Maps of the seismic intensity measure, of the mean damage to 
buildings and of the people dislocation for the considered testbed (adapted from Guidotti et al., 
2018a). 
 







min max mean 
st. 
dev. 
min max mean 
st. 
dev. 
Owner  1,293 1,574 1,422 44 0.45 0.55 0.50 0.02 
Renter  1,897 2,195 2,041 50 0.53 0.62 0.57 0.01 
Total  3,231 3,658 3,463 66 0.50 0.57 0.54 0.01 
 
Households in structures with estimated damage had a 24-89% probability of dislocation depending 
on the severity of the damage, structure type and neighborhood characteristics.  Based on the 
stochastic matching process of the population inventory and the building inventory the probability 
of dislocation between owners and renters can be compared.  As shown in Table B.2 renters are 
statistically more likely to dislocate than owners.  With 57% of the renter population dislocating and 
50% of the owner population dislocating.  This difference is due in part to the model which is based 
on empirical evidence that people in multifamily structures are more likely to be dislocated, however 
the results also suggest that people who are renters are living in structures that are more likely to be 
damaged.  
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Table B.2 shows the range and distribution of population dislocation based on Monte Carlo 
Simulation.  This distribution captures the uncertainty associated in the model of dislocation, the 
damage states of individual structures, and the number of persons living in individual structures.  The 
95% confidence interval for dislocation in Seaside for the given seismic event is between 3,333 
person and 3,593 persons or between 52% and 55% of the total population.  The upper bound of the 
confidence interval, 3,593 persons, was used to determine the reduction in demand on the water 
network.  The presented procedure may be adopted to update the initial demand for critical 
infrastructure, such as transportation and water systems, as shown in Section 6.2.3 and Section 6.3.3.  
As discussed in Section 6.3.3, considering a water system, possible lack of potable water at specific 
nodes may result in further population dislocation leading to an iterative process that demonstrates the 
interdependency between physical infrastructure and social systems.  
